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I INTRODUCTION
Technological advances in the last century simplified travel, enhanced
communication between countries, and allowed the people of each country to
become part of a global community with common interests and problems.' As a
result, cross-cultural marriages are increasing, providing a social mechanism with
the potential to foster understanding and tolerance among the many cultures of the
world.2 However, when these marriages dissolve and children are involved, the
subsequent custody battles become global, and the incidence of international child
abduction multiplies. 3 With the adoption of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention),4 cases of
international child abduction among signatory nations5 are handled by the prompt
I. See June Starr, The Global Battlefield: Culture and Interadonal Child Custody Disputes at Century's
End, I5ARIZ.J.INr'L&CoMp.L. 791,791 (1998).
2. See id,
3. See id. Approximately 35 children are abducted out of the United States each month and 15 to 40
children are abducted into the United States each year. See Eric S. Horstmeyer, The Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction: An Analysis of Tahan and Viragh and Their Impact on its Efficacy, 33
U. LoUsvLu . FAM. L 125.125 (1995).
4. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.LAS. No.
11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague Convention is an international treaty with
the single purpose of returng children to their country of habitual residence. See infra notes 72-320 and
accompanying text (discussing the Hague Convention).
5. Signatory nations are those nations that have signed and become a party to a treaty. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1387(7th ed. 1999). A nation becomes a party to a treaty by ratification orby accession. Ratification
ofa treaty by a nation is the establishment of final approval by parties to a treaty and consent to be bound by It. See
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return of the children to the country of their habitual residence,6 where disputes can
be resolved by the tribunals of that country
Together with a greater incidence of child abduction, another worldwide social
problem-domestic violence-is also gaining prevalence.3 Child abductions are
often associated with domestic violence,9 and prompt return of these children can
result in their re-victimization. 10 Consequently, in international child abduction cases
that involve domestic violence, the Hague Convention's primary interest in comity
may conflict with the best interests of the children."
id. at 1268-69. The accession to a treaty by a nation is the entrance into agreement with an existing treaty that has
already been agreed upon by othernations. See id. at 13. Signatory countries, also called Contracting Countries, am
those countries that have approved the Convention either by ratification or by accession. The Hague Convention
is in full force as a result of ratification or accession in the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
BelgiumBosnia-Heregovina,Canada,Chile,China(HngKongandMacauSpecalAdministraiveRegionsony),
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark (except the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Finland, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland(including thelsle of Man, the Cayman Islands, theFalklandslands, Montserrat, andBermuda), theUnited States,
and Venezuela. See Hague Conference on Private International Lawm Status Sheet Convention #28 (visited Mar.
26, 2000) <hup://www.hcch.nettelstatusabdshte.htnl> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). The
following countries conditionally approved the Hague Convention as a result of accession: the Bahamas, Belarus,
Belize, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Fiji, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland. Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, the Republic of Moldova, Monaco, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Poland,
Romania Saint Kitts and Nevis, Slovenia, South Africa, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. See
6. "Habitual residence" is purposefully not defined in the Hague Convention or in the federal statute that
implements theague ConventionintheUnited States. See42U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610(West 1999);seealsoRegan
Fordice Grilli, Dometic Wolence: Is It Being Sanctioned by the Hague Convention?, 4 Sw.I.L. &TRADEIN AM.
71, 74 (1997) (reporting that the framers of the Hague Convention intended forthe concept of "habitual residence"
to be fact-based rather than rigidly rule-based in an effort to promote consistency among the rulings of various
countries). Therefore, the definitions of habitual residence are derived from the various court decisions of the
signatory nations of the Hague Convention. See also In re Bates No. CA 122/89, Faro. Div Ct., (Eng. 1989)(explaining that there must be a"degree of settled purpose" and continuity to the place where the child lives for it
to be considered the"habitual residence"); see also Fer v. Evans-Feder, 63 E3d217,224 (3d Cir. 1995) (defining
"habitual residence" as a"place where [the child] has been physically present for an amount of time sufficient for
acclimatization and which has a 'degree of settled purpose' from the child's perspective); see also Friedrich v.
Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1396 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that "habitual residence" is the "customary residence
prior to the removal").
7. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
8. See Lori Heise et al., Ending Wolence Against Women, PoPULTION REPoRTs (visited Dec. 1999)
<http://www.jhuccp.orgpr/1/llcreds.stm> (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer) [hereinafter Ending
Violence Against Women].
9. See generally Judith Annatta, Getting Beyond the Law's Complicity in Intimate Wolence Against
Women, 33 W-AM=1-L REv. 773,796 (1997).
10. See id, at 798 (emphasizing that when the role that domestic violence plays in parental kidnaping is not
recognized, the "prompt return" provision of the Hague Convention could assist an abuser in retrieving the child
in order to punish or exert control over the abused parent or child).
11. See ElisaPerez-Vera, ExpanatoryReporton the Convention on the CivilAspects ofInternational Child
Abduction adopted by the Fourteenth Session, j 21, 25 (visited Feb. 26, 2000) <http:J/www.hiltonhouse.com/
articles/Perz putxt> (copy on file with 7the Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafterPerezReport] (explaining thatthe
drafters of the Hague Conference wished to avoid the use of "the best interest of the chile' as a legal standard and
therefore avoided using the teim in the language of the Treaty). However, the examples provided in the Treaty are
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The Hague Convention successfully facilitated the return of many abducted
children to the countries of its signatory nations.12 The Hague Convention prevents
an abducting parent from seeking a more favorable custody decision in another
country by requiring the return of an abducted child to the jurisdiction of his or her
home country.13 However, at the time the Hague Convention was drafted, domestic
violence had not yet been clearly exposed as asocial problem.1 4 Therefore, domestic
violence, though now viewed as a worldwide social problem,' 5 was not specifically
considered when the Hague Convention was drafted. The current impact of domestic
violence on child abduction challenges the traditional manner with which child
abduction is dealt internationally.
This Comment discusses the implications for the protection of children when
domestic violence and child abuse are involved in cases of international child
abduction to or from signatory nations of the Hague Convention. It focuses on the
potential inadequacies of the Hague Convention to protect these abducted children.
Part lI provides background information regarding the incidence and characteristics
of domestic violence, child abuse, and parental child abduction.16 Part III examines
the provisions of the Hague Convention and its narrowly applied exceptions. 17 Part
IV reviews select cases of international child abduction involving domestic violence
and child abuse that are defended under the "grave risk of harm" exception.'8 Part
IV also emphasizes an exemplary case of first impression involving children
abducted from France to the United States, in which the court found clear and
convincing evidence of domestic violence. t9 Part V considers changes in the
application of the Hague Convention that will better protect children in cases where
"concrete illustrations" ofa"best interests of the child" standard. See Id. Because the best interests of the child arm
at the heart of a custody decision, determination of such interests are, in fact, custody determinations. See 14 122(remarking that "internaljurisdictins" award custodyprimarily based on the best interests of the child). The drafters
oftheTreaty believedthatthe "best interests ofthe child" are served by protecting the child from wrongful removal
orretention. See id. Somecourts reason that the best interests ofthe childare most appropriately determined by the
tribunal of the child's habitual residence, where facts essential to such determinations are most readily available to
that tribunal. See Robinson v. Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339,1344 (D. Colo. 1997); see also Turner v. Froweln, 752
S.2d 955, 971 (1999); see also Gunsburg v. Greenwald (1993) (Israel), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton
House (visited July 6, 2000) <http.//www.hiltonhouse.comicasestgunsbur2.isr> (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Gunsburg].
12. See Jacqueline D. Golub, The InternationalParental Kidnaping CrimeAct of 1993: The UnitedStates'
Attempt to Get Our Children Back-How Is It Working ?, 24 BROOK. L IT'L L.797, 797 (1999).
13. See Grilli, supra note 6, at 73.
14. SeeCarolS.BrucTheHagueChildAbductionConventon:PastAccomplshmaens Future Challenges,
1 EtR. J L. REFoRM 97,105 (1998/1999).
15. See Armatta, supra note 9, at 775 (describing violence against women in intimate relationships as "a
worldwide phenomenon").
16. See infra notes 21-71 and accompanying text.
17. See infia notes 72-320 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 321-516 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 414-83 and accompanying text (discussing the case ofBlondin v. Dubois).
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clear and convincing evidence of the risk of grave harm to children by the non-
abducting parent is evident.20
II. BACKGROUND
Many victims of domestic violence flee their homes to protect themselves and
their children from their abusers.2 Perhaps because domestic violence most often
occurs within the privacy of the home?2 and is so pervasively linked to the abuser's
culture, 3 data regarding its mere existence lacks precision 4 Nevertheless, the
existence of a nexus between international child abduction and domestic violence
is demonstrated by a number of cases. 2s Accordingly, a basic understanding of the
characteristics of domestic violence, child abuse, and international child abduction
is important to the discussion of any case brought under the Hague Convention
involving these issues.
20. See infra notes 517-50 and accompanying text.
21. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE IMPACr OF DOMEMCic VIOLENCE ON CHmLDREN: A REPORT TO Tm
PREnSW OF THE A.B.A. 1. 14 (1994) [hereinafter IMPACTODOMESiIC VIOLENCE].
22. See PARTERVIoLEmCE.:ACOMp ENSIPRVEWOP20YEARSoFRESEARCH 1.73 (lanaL Jasinski
& Linda M. Williams eds., 1998) [hereinafter PARTNERVIOLENcE].
23. See Armatta, supra note 9, at 776-86 (detailing the insidious manner in which domestic violence is
woven into one's culture through women's accounts of domestic violence among different cultures followed by a
discussion ofthe history of"legalcomplicity" among the legal systems ofthe world); see also id. at782 (describing
the "duty of chastisement" in England and North America whereby husbands were encouraged to physically
discipline their wives, and a 1990 decree in Iraq allowing men to kill their wives for adultery).
24. See U at 775 (admitting that "[t]he actual extent of violence in the home may never be accurately
known" but asserting that domestic violence is part of many families around the world involving all classes and
cultures of people).
25. See, ag., Blondin v. Dubois, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283,285 (S.N.Y. 2000) (finding clear and convincing
evidence of domestic violence and child abuse, and therefore the children were not returned); see also Nunex-
Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 374 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding insufficient evidence of child abuse and
therefore requiring thereturn f th child); see also Rodriguez v.Rodriguez, 33 R .upp. 2d456,456 (D. Md. 1999)
(refusing father's petition for the return of the child due to child abuse and domestic violence); see also brmer v.
Frowein, 752 A.2d 955,955 (Conn. 2000) (remanding for exploration of whether the child might be repatriated
without being in the custody of abusing father); see also Wright v. Gueriel (1993) (Fr.), available in William M.
Hilton, Hilton House (visited Sept 7,2000) <http-lwww.hiltonhouse.com/caseslWright-france.txt> (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (denying return of child due to evidence of violent threats) [hereinafter Wright].
395
2000/International Child Abduction and Domestic Violence
A. Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
Domestic violence and child abuse are encompassed by the term "family
violence.' 26 Domestic violence or "battering 27 is defined as the use, or threat of use,
of physical force against a partner that results in fear or injury Although instances
do occur when women batter men, most domestic violence is perpetrated by men
upon women.29 Child abuse refers to the infliction of injuries upon children by
parents and other adult caretakers.30
Domestic violence is recognized as a serious worldwide problem?1 In the past
decade, the United Nations took a stand opposing violence against women32 and
child abuse,33 and participated in the development of strategies for the global
elimination of violence against women. A recent study reveals that at least one out
of every three women around the world is "beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise
abused in her lifetime."35 Unfortunately, between forty and sixty percent of men that
abuse women also abuse children. 6 Moreover, twenty percent of women that abduct
a child do so to escape family violence.
37
26. See Armatta, supra note 9. at 775.
27. IMPACr oF Domarsc VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 1. The term "domestic violence" is used in this
Comment because it is the more commonly recognized term; however, the term "partner violence" is synonymous
with "domestic violence" See PARTNERVIoLENCE, supra note 22, at73. The term "partner violence" emphasizes
that violence can occur between male partners or female partners, as well as, male and female partners. See Id.
28. See IMPAcr OF DoMEsTc VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 1. When partners are married, such abuse is
termed "spousal abuse." See id. However, because many partners never marry or marriages end in divorce, the
broader term, domestic violence, is used to include all partners living together. See Id.
29. See i. at I. (reporting that of all U.S. spousal violence 91% involved women victimized by husbands
or ex-husbands).
30. See d. (describing child abuse, sibling abuse, and elder abuse as types of violence that occur under the
broader umbrella of domestic violence). Child abuse is also defined as "[a]n intentional or neglectful physical or
emotional injury imposed on a child, including sexual molestation:' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 10 (7th edition
1999).
31. See Annatta, supra note 9, at 844.
32. See Declaration on the Elimtnation of Wolence against Women, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., art. 4, U.N.
Doe. AIRES/48/104 (1993) (declaringthat"s]iates should condemn violence against women and should not invoke
any custom, tradition, or religious consideration to avoid the obligations with respect to its elimination').
33. See Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at art. 1-54, U.N. Doe. 44/25 (1989)
(recognizing rights and needs of children internationally).
34. See International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, Model Strategies and
Practical Measures on the Elimination of WoienceAgainst Women in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice: Resource Manual 1 (1999) (visited Feb. 12,2000) <http:/137.82.153.100/reportsdvawmanua.pdi, (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
35. Ending rolence Against Women, supra note 8 (reporting the findings of the first worldwide study of
domestic violence, including 2,000 domestic violence studies in at least 20 countries).
36. SeeAMERICANPSYCHO LOG ICALASSOCIATION,VioLE AN T FAMLY:REPORTOFT AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGY ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THEFAMILY 80 (1996).
37. See Grilli, supra note 6, at 85. Conversely, batterers may retaliate against their former partners by
abducting a child produced by the relationship. See ImpA= OF DoM EIC VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 14. See
Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955,962 (Conn. 2000) (detailing the facts of a case in which the abusing father took
a child from the mother without informing her of the whereabouts of the child as a means of retaliation against the
mother).
396
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Children that do not experience actual physical abuse but are exposed to
domestic violence can suffer the same enduring effects as children that are
physically abused.33 Children see and hear more violence than theirparents realize.3 9
Violence in family relationships profoundly effects the development of children. It
also increases the likelihood that, as adults, these children will exhibit aggressive
behavior and violence against their own partners and children, commit violent
crimes, or view violence among intimates as normal, or at least, expected behavior. °
Flight from the abusing parent and displacement to a shelter creates a stressful
situation for the child involved.41 Children often exhibit more signs of depression,
anxiety, and lower self-esteem living in a shelter than living in the violent home
from which they came 2 The victims of domestic abuse who do not have financial
resources face a complex dilemma- either find shelter in a setting that is traumatic
for their children or stay with their abuser, placing themselves and their children at
risk of further physical and psychological harm.43
Perhaps due to the perception of domestic violence as a familial problem that
can be remedied by mediation or non-legal interventions such as counseling,"
women often stay or return to their abusers.4 5 Regrettably, arrests, prosecutions,
restraining orders, batterer rehabilitative treatment, and other non-legal interventions
prove ineffective in deterring repeated abuse.6 As violence increases, women are
compelled to leave abusive relationships. They realize that "he" will not change and
the children are being harmed 7
38. See Ending Violence Against Women, supra note 8.
39. See PARTNERVILENcpsuprmanote22,at78;seealsoL.A.McCloskeyet.al,TheEffectsofSystematic
Family Violence on Children's Mental Health, 66 CHILD DEV. 1239, 1239-61 (1995) (finding that half of the
children from violent families witness potentially lethal violence, such as choking). Children hear screaming,
pleading, and sobbing as fists hit bodies, property is shattered, and people are thrown against walls. See U They
may also see blood, bruises, and othermanifestations of physical injury. See also IMPAcrOI'DomsIc V[iOLENcF,
supra note 21, at I (estimating that 87% of children in homes with domestic violence witness the battering).
40. See [MPACroFDOMESncVIoLENCEsupra note 21.at I.The use, rationale, and acceptance of violence
are learned as a result ofwitnessing and experiencing violence. See RiCHARD . GLL sTHEVIoLENrHoOME 189
(1972).
41. See PARTER VIOLENCE, supra note 22, at 93.
42. See id,
43. See IMPACr OFDOMESTC VOLENCE, supra note 21, at 17.
44. See JEMMERY FAOAN, A Presentation at the Annual Conference on Research and Evaluation of the
National Institute ofJustice, The Bureau of Justice Assistance, andThe Office ofJuvenilelJustice andDelinquency
Prevention on the Subject of "What To Do About Crime" (JuLY 10, 1995), reprinted in Nil RES. REP.: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF DoMesuc VIL LNCE: PROMISES AND LIMrTS 1, at 8 (citation omitted) [hereinafter
CPMuNALIz'nON OF DOMESmtC VIOLENCE].
45. See Ending Violence Against Women, supra note 8, pt. 2.3 (listing the following reasons that women
world-wide remain in abusiverelationship: fear of retribution, lack of independent financial resources, concern for
the children, emotional dependence, non-supportive family and friends, the social stigma of being single, and "an
abiding hope that 'he will change').
46. See CPIMALIZATIONOFDOMESFIc VIOLENCF, supra note 44, at 1.
47. See Ending Violence Against Women, supra note 8, pt. 2.3.
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Escape from the abuser itself is dangerous because once the parents physically
separate, the violence often escalates4 Abused women are at the highest risk of
being killed by their batterers during the time following separation. 49 Considering
these aspects of domestic violence, the decision to abduct children from their
country of habitual residence is a reasonable course of action. Indeed, for those
abused, international child abduction may be viewed as necessary for survival.
B. International Child Abduction
International child abduction or kidnaping 0 generally refers to the wrongful
removal or retention of a child by the child's parent or guardian to another country.
The abductions are most often associated with custody disputes between the
parents. 5 The United States reported 6,774 cases of parental child abduction
between 1976 and 1996.52 Since the ratification of the Hague Convention, the return
rate of abducted children to the United States increased from twenty percent to
seventy-two percent5 3 About ninety percent of those children abducted from the
United States have been returned." Twenty years ago, the majority of abducting
parents were fathers5  Today, seventy percent are mothers.! Despite the strides
made in returning children, the number of children abducted continues to rise,
48. See ImPACTOFDOMESTzcVIOLENCa supra note 21, at 11.
49. See id; see Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 R Supp. 2d456, 461-62 (D. Md. 1999) (acknowledging that the
very proceedings of the case "increased exponentially" the risk to the wife and children of a plaintiff found to be
abusive).
50. See Perez Report, supra note 11,S55 (explaining that the use of the term "abduction" in the title of the
Hague Convention is used to "attract attention" despite the term's legal precision). Conversely, the United States
uses the term "kidnapping" in its International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993 (IPKCA), which makes It
a federal crime fora parent to wrongfullyremove orretain achild anywhere outside the United States. See 18U.S.C.§ 1204 (1995); see also infra note 118 (discussing the IPKCA).
51. See LindaSiberman, Hague Convention onInternational ChlldAbductlon:ABriefOverview andCase
Law Analysis, 28 FAM.L.Q. 9. 11 (1994); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text (inferring that the other
89% of women who abduct a child do so for reasons other than to escape family violence).
52. See Golub, supra note 12, at pt. I.B. Annual statistical data regarding the prevalence of international
child abduction in the United States is not available; however, last year the State Department reported to Congress
plans for a comprehensive tracking system that allows for accurate statistics on child abductions to and from the
United States. See Mary A. Ryan, Statement Before the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House
of Representatives Concerning the Implementation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int'l Child
Abduction (Oct. 14, 1999), reprinted in Statement of Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs of the U.S.
Department of State (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http:I/travel.state.govll1499mar.html> (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter State Dep't Report to Congress]. The United Kingdom reports an 'annual
increase from 16 cases in 1986 to 191 cases in 1991. GmAtLiNE VAN BIEREN THE B~rIiSH INST. OF HUMAN
RiGHs, 1 BEST In r OF Tm CHiLD-NERNAoONAL Co-OPERATON ON CHILD AnBDucnoN 10 (1993).
53. See State Dep't Report to Congress, supra note 52, 7.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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speculatively due to the greaternumber of multi-cultural marriages and divorces and
the ease of international travel 5 7
Wrongful removal occurs "when one parent wrongfully leaves the country with
the child"; whereas, wrongful retention is triggered "at the point in time when the
wronged parent asks for the return of the child, and the other parent refuses." 8
Abductions often arise from one parent's desire to obtain or retain custody of a
child, either for love of the child or in retaliation against the other parent5 9 The
abducting parent may experience a complex mixture of emotions, including love,
hate, fear, jealousy, and deprivation.0° Eighty percent of the left-behind parents
reported that prior to the abduction, the abducting parent stated that the left-behind
parent would never see his or her children again.61 Many left-behind parents also
reported that the abductor threatened their lives, the lives of their children, or the
lives of others.6 2 In addition to a desire to obtain or retain custody of a child, other
motives for abduction include hope for the family to ultimately reunite or concern
that the best interests of the child require a different religious and social culture.63
Regardless of the motives, children suffer conflicting emotional turmoil as they
are forced to choose between parents. The aggrieved, left-behind parent experiences
great pain.6' One study shows that more than half of the children abducted exhibit
57. See VAN BuEREN, supra note 52, at 5.
58. Star, supra note 1, at 795-96. 'Innocent parent." "l]eft-bchind parent," "deprived parent," "wronged
parent" and "aggrieved parent" are synonymous terms for the parent from whom the child is taken. See Monica
Marie Copertino, Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: An Analysis of Its
Efficacy, 6 CONN.J.INT'LL. 715,742 (1991) (depicting the parent from whom the child is taken as the "innocent
parent"); see also Linda Girdner et a]., Profile of the Abductors Most Likely to Succeed (visited Jan. 5, 2000)
<http.//wwwJiltonhouse.com/aticleslProfiLe-abductor.txt> (copy onfilewith 77e TansnationalLawyer) (referring
to the parent from whom the child is taken as same parent as the "left-behind" parent); see also Rania Nanos, The
Views of A Child: Emerging Interpretation and Sig n icance of the Child's Objection Defense Under the Hague
ChildAbduction Convention, 22 BROOK L I''L L 437, 447 (1996) (using the term "aggrieved parent"); see also
Starr, upm note 1 at796 (rferring to the parent without the child as th wrongedpant). seals VANB RN,
supra note 52, at 5 (identifying the same parent as the "deprived parent").
59. See Tom Harper, The Limitations of the Hague Convention and Alternative Remedies for a Parent
Including Re-Abduction, 9 EMoRYbII'LL.REv. 257,257 (1995).
60. See VANBuEREN, supra note 52, at 5.
61. See Girdneretal., supra note 58.
62. See id. (reporting that 60% of wronged parents reported that the abducting parent threatened the lire of
the left-behind parent, 20% reported that same threat made against the children's lives, and 40% reported similar
threats to others); see also supra note 37 (highlighting that not all abductions involving domestic violence involve
the flight of the abused; sometimes the abuser becomes the abductor of the children and the abduction is itself
another form of violence against the partner).
63. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 52, at 5 (characterizing some abductions as "last ditch attempt[s] to pull
back together a broken family"). But cf. id. (noting that in some cases, however, the abduction is motivated by the
abuse of the dowry tradition for the benefit of the abducting parent rather than the child). See id. A dowry, a
brideprice, or a lobola are words used from Portugal and Spain to India, Afica, or the Middle East, meaning the
paymentmade to the husband's family upon marriage and hasbeen linked to murders committed in efforts to obtain
material wealth. See Armatta, supra note 9, at 787-88.
64. See Horstmeyer, supra note 3, at 125.
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a decline in their ability to function from the time taken to the time returned, 6 In
addition to the conflicting emotions and feelings of guilt that children may
experience after being abducted by one parent, children that are taken to another
country must deal with the additional stress of adapting to a foreign culture with
language barriers and the isolation from established supportive relationships."
Wronged parents of international child abduction not only suffer the pain of loss
and the fear of not knowing the condition of their children, but they are also
disadvantaged in finding a remedy.Y First, the parent must find the child, which is
not easy in a foreign country even with governmental assistance."8 In some countries
that are parties to the Hague Convention, locating the child is hindered by a lack of
interagency coordination and resources.69 However, the deterring effects of the
Hague Convention are evidenced by the fact that, since the creation of the
Convention, the number of children abducted to non-Hague Convention countries
has grown, while the number abducted to Hague Convention countries has
declined!') Despite its imperfections, the Hague Convention provides a "vast
improvement over the lack of any international mechanism whatsoever" and is well
worth the continued work to improve its implementation.7'
III. THE HAGUE CONVENTION
A. Ratzfication and Accession By Party Countries
The Hague Convention on Private International Law convenes every four years
to evaluate conventions devised by specialized groups. 72 In October 1980, the
65. See Geoffrey L. Greif, Impact on Children of International Abduction (visited Feb. 13, 2000)
<http://www.hiltonhouse.com/articlesfImpact.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (summarizing a
study of the effects the crossing of international borders during a parental abduction had on children, drawn from
a sample of 371 searching parents).
66. See id.
67. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 52, at 5.
68. Compare id. (describing generally the disadvantages of the deprived parent in locating a child in
"unfamiliar foreign terrain" and then trying to assert custodial rights), with Harper, supra note 59, at 264-67
(exploring the difficulties encountered when a child is abducted to "safe harbors," meaning nations that are not
parties to the Hague Convention, where custody is determined by the internal laws of that nation and often favor
the fatherregardless of the circumstances). A full discussion of international child abduction involving non-Hague
Convention countries is beyond the scope of this Comment.
69. SeeState Dep'tReporrto Congress, supra note 52; seealso Bruch, supra note 14, at 106 (depicting an
increased membership in the Hague Convention by countries that are not equipped to carry out the necessary
obligations of the Convention and noting that in 1997, a study of Central Authority operations revealed that three
member countries could not be reached at the facsimile numbers that they had provided to the Permanent Bureau
and an additional country replied to an inquiry by requesting a copy of the Convention).
70. See Golub, supra note 12, at 797 (noting that the United States passed of the IPKCA of 1993 out of
frustration over the inability to deter the growing incidence of child abduction to nonsignatory countries). Three-
fourths of the world's countries are not signatories to the Hague Convention. See Starr, supra note 1, at 793.
71. State Dep't Report to Congress, supra note 52, at 2.
72. See Copertino, supra note 58, at 720.
The Transnational Lawyerl Vol. 13
Convention explored the increased prevalence of parental kidnaping 3 Convention
members unanimously approved the Hague Convention,74 and the first countries to
sign the resulting Treaty were Canada, France, Greece, and Switzerland.' 5 Since the
Convention was opened for ratification by the member nations, fifty-three
countries, 6 including the United States,' 7 became Party Countries either through
ratification or accession.7
B. Purpose and Philosophy
Article I of the Hague Convention clearly states the purposes of the Treaty. The
Treaty seeks (1) "to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or
retained in any Contracting State" and (2) "to ensure that rights of custody and of
access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other
Contracting State.' 9 The Hague Convention requires a "respectful reciprocity and
extremely close cooperation" among its signatory countries.80 The Convention's
goal of preventing international child abduction rests upon the unanimous refusal
of member countries to recognize wrongful parental kidnaping by promptly
returning abducted children to their habitual residences.81 In practice, this requires
that each Contracting State acknowledge that the authorities of the child's habitual
residence are in the best position to decide questions of custody and visitation. 2
73. See.
74. See Id. at 720 n.38 (noting that 29 countries adopting the Hague Convention included: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovaia,Denmark, Egypt, the FederalRepublic ofGerany, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Surinam, lTrkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia).
75. See id. at 720 (stating that the United States signed the convention on December 23, 1981).
76. See Office of C1ildren's Issues, the U.S. Central Authority, Hague Convention of 25 October1 980 on
the CivilAspects of International ChildAbduction: Party Countries and Effective Dates with U.S., (visited Feb. 27,
2000) <htp://travl.state.gov/hagueL-isthtml> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting the
following countries as Party Countries with the United States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belize,
Bosnia and Herzogovina, Burldno Faso, Canada, Chile, China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region only),
Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy. Luxembourg, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mauritius,
Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands. New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Macau, Romania, Slovenia,
South Afica, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland, theUnited Kingdom, Bermuda, the CaymanIslands,
the Falkland Islands, the Isle of Man, Montserrat, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe).
77. The U.S. Senate unanimously ratified the Hague Convention on October 9, 1986. See Copertino, supra
note 58, at 721. The United States codified theTreaty in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act of 1988.
See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11601-11610 (West 1995).
78. See generally supra note 5 (defining ratification and accession).
79. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
80. Jan Rewers McMillan, Getting Them Back. The Disappointing Reality of Return Orders Under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects ofinternational ChildAbduction, 141. AM. ACAD. MAntzM.ILAw. 99, 100
(1997). Indeed, commentators predicted that the effectiveness of the Convention would depend upon"the concept
of reciprocity." Perez Report. supra note 11, 137; see also Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 664 (D. Kan.
1993).
81. See Perez Report, supra note 11, 134.
82. See McMillan, supra note 80, at 102.
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While the preamble of the Hague Convention declares "the interest[s] of
children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody,"" the
Treaty is not concerned with the determination of which parent gets custody of the
child or the enforcement of decisions regarding custody." The simple and limited
objective of the Hague Convention is to cause the prompt return of an abducted
child to his or her habitual residence so that a court of that country can resolve issues
of custody and visitation.85 The Treaty is based upon the recognition that the "true
victim" of child abduction is the child who suffers the uprooting from his or her
environment, the traumatic loss of contact with a parent who has participated in his
or her care, and the insecurity involved in adapting to a strange language and
culture.8
The Hague Convention "unequivocally" supports the concept that "access rights
are the natural counterpart of custody rights" and must be recognized as belonging
to the non-custodial parent. Although the Treaty does not define "access rights,"
it does characterize "the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place
other than the child's habitual residence" as a right included in the rights of access.8"
The Convention has no mandatory provision for the effectuation of access rights
similar to its provisions for breaches of custody rights, but it seeks to promote the
exercise of access rights through goodwill measures extended by the Central
Authority of the Contracting State involved.8 9
C. Provisions
1. The Child's Prompt Return to Habitual Residence
The Hague Convention does not deal with any criminal aspect of child
abduction or extradition, ° but instead provides a civil remedy'-athe mandatory and
prompt return of the child to his or her habitual residence. 9' Contracting States are
required under the Hague Convention to use "the most expeditious procedures
available" to achieve the return of the child to his or her "habitual residence."93
Although the term "habitual residence" is not defined by the Treaty, its meaning can
83. Hague Convention, supra note 4, preamble.
84. See Copertino, supra note 58, at 722.
85. see idL
86. See Perez Report. supra note 11, 124.
87. Id. 126.
88. Hague Convention, supra note 4. art. 5(b).
89. See A. E. Anton, The Hague Convention on International ChildAbduction 30NT'W& CoMP. LQ. 537,
554-55 (1981).Mr. Anton was the chairman ofthe committee that drafted the Hague Convention. See id. at556 n.1;
see also supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and duties of the Central Authority).
90. See Copertino, supra note 58, at 722.
91. See Golub, supra note 12, at 798.
92. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
93. L art. 2.
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be gleaned from a number of Hague Convention cases. 9e A comprehensive definition
of "habitual residence" is the place where a child was "physically present for an
amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a 'degree of settled
purpose' from the child's perspective."95 The Convention fosters expeditious action
on the part of the Contracting States by bestowing upon the applicant the right to
request a statement explaining the reason for a delay of more than six weeks from
the initiation of proceedings to the decision regarding the return of the child.
96
2. Central Authorities
The success or failure of the Hague Convention to effectuate the return of a
child is dependent upon a system of "Central Authorities. '" Each Contracting State
must specify a Central Authority to carry out the duties imposed by the
Convention.98 The designation of a Central Authority is intended to streamline the
process of returning a child to his or her habitual residence by bypassing diplomatic
channels and proceeding directly to the administrative body that typically handles
custody and care of children.9 Yet, an application to a Central Authority is not
required under the Hague Convention, and a wronged parent may instead go directly
to the judicial entities of the Contracting State to bring an action under the
Convention.1t° However, perhaps due to knowledge gained through experience,
Central Authorities can expedite the process of finding and returning an abducted
child.1 't
The language of the Hague Convention allows the role of the Central
Authorities to vary from state to state.1°2 Nevertheless, the role of the Central
Authorities generally involves both judicial remedies and the coordination of
various non-judicial tasks to mediate the return of abducted children.'03 The duties
of Central Authorities include the following: (1) locating abducted children, 43 (2)
94. See generally supra note 6 (reviewing several cases that define habitual residence).
95. Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 .3d 217.224 (3d Cir. 1995); see also supra note 6.
96. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 11.
97. See id arts. 6-7.
98. See Id. art. 6. For example, the Office of Children's Issues of the U.S. Department of State is the
designated Central Authority forchildrenabductedfrom theUnited States, andtheNational CenterforMissingand
Exploited Children is the Central Authority for children abducted to the United States. See Hague Conference on
Privane International Law, Central Authorities #28 (last modified June 5. 2000) <http:/iwww.hech.
netkdAuthortieslcaabduct.html> (copy on filewith The TransnationalLawyer) (identifying the Central Authorities
of Contracting Countries to the Hague Convention and providing addresse e-mail addresses, and telephone
numbers for each of those Central Authorities).
99. See Anton, supra note 89, at 547.
100. See Slberman, supra note 51, at 13.
101. See id. (noting the importance of the Central Authorities in the process of returning abducted children).
102. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, arts. 6-7; see also Anton, supra note 89, at 547.
103. See Silbetman, supra note 51, at 12.
104. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(a).
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assisting in all possible ways to amicably resolve the abduction event, ° (3) taking
steps to prevent further harm to the child and ensuring unbiased treatment of the
interested parties, °s (4) providing information about the laws of their states and the
background of a child involved with an application,1e7 (5) instituting proceedings for
the return of childrent)S (6) planning and implementing the safe return of abducted
children,1 9 (7) providing or facilitating the provision of legal assistance and
counsel,110 and (8) in some cases, arranging the effective exercise of rights of
access."' These duties may be carried out directly by the Central Authority or by
other public or private agencies at the direction of the Central Authority." 2
3. Costs and Expenses
The Central Authority of each Contracting State is responsible for its own costs
arising from implementation ofthe Hague Convention.1 3 Unless a Contracting State
specifically makes a "reservation,""' 4 the State may not impose a charge for
applications submitted to its Central Authority under the Convention or for costs of
proceedings or legal counsel." 5 Additionally, Contracting States are obligated to
ensure that the same legal aid services that are provided to the nationals of its own
State are provided to persons from other Contracting States."" Applicants may be
required to pay for the expenses involved in the return of the child, or a court may
105. See id art. 7(c).
106. See id art. 7(b).
107. See id. art. 7(d)-(e).
108. See id. art. 7(f).
109. See id art. 7(h).
110. See id. art. 7(g).
111. See i art. 7().
112. See id. art. 7; see also Anton, supra note 89, at 547.
113. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 26.
114. See id t. 42 (providing that each Contracting State, at the time of ratification, acceptance, approval,
or accession of the Convention, has the option to declare "reservations" to assuming the legal fees which are not
covered by its legal aid program); see also id. arts. 24, 42 (permitting only two reservations upon becoming a
Contracting State: (1) a Contracting State may opt not to be responsible for the court and legal costs that exceed the
amount covered by its own legal aid system and (2) a Contracting State may object to providing applications and
related documents in either French or English, but not both). A reservation is "a nation's formal declaration, upon
signing orratifying a treaty, that its willingness to become a party to the treaty is conditioned on certain additional
terms that will limit the effect of the treaty in some way." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1309 (7th ed. 1999).
115. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 26; see also Silberman, supra note 51, at 14 (reporting that
other Contracting States have sharply criticized the United States for making a reservation limiting its obligation
to cover legal costs beyond that provided by its own system of legal aid). The U.S. reservation to the Hague
Convention is mitigated somewhat by its codification of the Treaty. See International Child Abduction Remedies
Act,42U.S.C.A. § 11607(b)(1)(3) (West 1995) (requiring acourt ordering thereturn ofachitd to order the abductor
to pay legal fees as "clearly inappropriate"). The U. S. State Department also seeks to provide attorney services by
attempting to enlist private attorneys on a pro bono or reduced-fee basis. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 14. In
California, local prosecutors may acton behalf ofapplicantsbringing actionsundertheHague Convention. See CAL
FAM. CODE §§ 3130-3133 (West 1994).
116. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 25.
404
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 13
direct the abductor to pay the applicant's necessary expenses incurred in searching
for the child and in returning the child, including legal and travel costs."7
4. Non-Exclusivity Provision
The Hague Convention does not preclude action taken simultaneously under
alternate laws of a Contracting State.1 The non-exclusivity feature of the Hague
Convention is demonstrated in the following three ways: (1) the court or
administrative authority of any Contracting State may order the return of the child
at its discretion," 9 regardless of the applicable exceptions,12 (2) the Convention
does not restrict the right to bring an action directly to the judicial or administrative
authorities of a Contracting State, whether it is or is not based upon the Hague
Convention,'21 and (3) the Hague Convention only takes precedence over the Hague
Convention of October 5, 1961 regarding the protection of minors, and otherwise
does not limit the application of any other treaty or law of the Contracting State
governing the return of an abducted child.'2 The non-exclusive nature of the Hague
Convention is supported by the fact that the Convention does not speak to the merits
117. See id, art. 26; see also Anton, supra note 89, at 554.
118. See William M. Hilton, The Non-Exclusivity Feature of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 9 Am. J. FAM. L 69 (1995), available at <http.//www.hiltonhouse.conarticles/
Nonexclu.art> (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer). A discussion of alternative law is beyond the scope
of this Conment, but the reader is advised that there are several avenues available to address international child
abduction under the laws of theUnited States and otherContracting States of theHague Convention. In the United
States, in lieu oforinaddition toan action broughtunderthelHague Convention, ale-ftbehind parent may alsobring
an action in the U.S. courts under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act of 1980 (UCCIA). See National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform StateLaws, Uniform Child CusodyJurlsdictionAct(1968) (visitedJune
29, 2000) <http.//www.hltonhouse.con-codesUccja.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). The
purpose of the UCCIA fs to provide a mechanism to prevent conflicting custody decrees by requiring all thosewho
enact the Act to grant full faith and credit to the"hor'nejurisdiction of the child. See id, The UCCIA provides the
following advantages for a left-behind parent. (1) the Act is effective for the return of any child under 18 years of
age rather than 16 and (2) the exceptions to return that apply under the Hague Convention do not apply under
UCCIA. See Hilton, supra. However, six U.S. states have not adopted the international application of UCCJA,
including the following: Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Indiana. See Starr, supra note
1, at 502-03. The reader is cautioned to "ci]eck the specific law of each state under the UCCJA." Hilton, supra.
Another U.S. law involving international child abduction is the IPKCA of 1993. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (1993).
This Act makes "international parental kidnapping a federal crime." Golub, supra note 12, at 797. The IPKCA is
intended for use when non-signatory nations are involved in the parental abduction of a child. See id. In fact.
President Clinton emphasized Congress' intent that the Hague Convention is the preferred law governing
international child abduction and thatthel PKCA should only be used when the Hague Convention cannot be used.
See id. Another alternative to the Hague Convention, in both Israel and the United States, is a habeas corpus
petition. See In Re Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Coffield, 644 N.E.2d 662 (Ohio 1994); A v. B (1992)
(Isr), available in William H. Hilton, Hilton House (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http.lwww.hlltonbouse.comf
casestAvb.isr> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
119. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 18.
120. See infranotes 151-245andaccompanyingtext(discussingtheexceptions toretum ofachildunderthe
Hague Convention).
121. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 29.
122. See id. art. 34.
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of a custody determination, whereas actions under alternative laws generally
determine which parent has custody based upon the merits of the case.1
23
D. Requirements for Application
A case brought under the Hague Convention must meet several simple
requirements. As indicated by the title, preamble, and structure of the Treaty, the
Convention applies only to'international situations of child abduction.17 TheHague
Convention does not apply to any child who has reached sixteen years of age,
125
even if the child reaches age sixteen after proceedings have begun. 2 6 The removal
or retention of a child must be wrongful to qualify for governance under the Treaty,
that is, the removal or retention of the child must also breach the other parent's
rights of custody.'27 Furthermore, the non-abducting parent must have exercised
custody over the child prior to the abduction.'2 Custody rights may arise by
operation of the law, by judicial or administrative decision, or by an agreement that
has legal effect.' 29
The Hague Convention differentiates the "right of custody" from the "right of
access." The right of custody includes "the right to determine the child's place of
residence," and the breach of that right triggers application of the Treaty.'" The
recognition of the right of access-the right to take a child to a place other than the
child's habitual residence for a period of time upon which the parents have mutually
agreed 3t-is encouraged by the Convention.132 However, the Convention has no
mandatory provision by which a parent may secure access rights.
123. See Hilton, supra note 118; see Perez Report, supra note 11, ft 39, 40, 112, 139 (supporting the
interpretation of the Hague Convention as a non-exclusive Treaty); see also Anton, supra note 89, at 555
(concluding that the Hague Convention plainly designs its provisions to be non-exclusive).
124. See Anton, supra note 89, at 544.
125. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
126. See Copertino, supra note 58, at 731.
127. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
128. See U art.3(b);seealkoPerezReport supra note 11, 71 (recognizing custody rights as including the
right to consent, regardless of the form of custody, physical or otherwise). Therefore, the requirement that the non-
abductingparentexercise custody rights prior to theabduction does not necessarily mean that the parent had to have
physical custody ofthe child for the abduction for the removal orrtention to be wrongful; however, lack ofoonsent
by the non-abducting parent does make the removal or retention wrongful. See iU
129. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 3; see also Perez Report, supra note 11, U 67, 68, 69, 70
(describing the Convention's intent to broadly interpret custody rights to include not only formal legal rights, but
also informal privateagreementsbetweenpartiesregardingthe custody oftheirchildren);seealsoAustralanFamly
Law Act 1975, § 63, available at <httpl/www.hiltonhouse.com/articlestCusrht.aus> (copy on file with The
Transnaional Lawyer) (providing Australian law whereby in the absence of a custody order, both parents have
equal rights of custody).
130. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.
131. See id.
132. See iUL art. 21 (binding Central Authorities to promote access rights by removing "as far as possible"
interference with those rights).
133. See Anton, supra note 89, at 555.
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Any person or institution having a claim of child abduction may apply to the
Central Authority of any Contracting State for relief; however, direct application to
the Central Authority of the child's habitual residence is usually more convenient.'34
Application to a Central Authority is not mandatory when bringing an action under
the Hague Convention because an action can be brought directly to the courts. 35
Nevertheless, application to a Central Authority has an important advantage-a
channel of communication between the Contracting State of the child's habitual
residence and the Contracting State of the child's abduction at no cost to the
applicant. '36
The application to a Central Authority must include the following information:
(1) the identification of the child and the abducting parent,1 37 (2) the date of birth of
the child,138 (3) the grounds upon which the applicant bases the claim,139 and (4) any
information regarding the location of the child and the abducting person." The
application may also be supplemented with the following documents: (1) a copy of
a court or administrative decision or legal agreement,'4'(2) a certificate or affidavit
from a competent authority of the state of the child's habitual residence explaining
the relevant domestic law, 42 and (3) "any other relevant document. '1 43 Therefore,
the applicant's burden of proof is to establish wrongful removal or retention.144 The
applicant does not necessarily need a court decision regarding custody to meet that
burden.1 45 Rather, the applicant need only show by apreponderance of evidence that
custody rights have been breached. 146 In a Hague Convention action, the court may
take judicial notice of the relevant custody law of the state of the child's habitual
residence.147
134. See Anton, supra note 89, at 547-48 (remarking that a person seeking the return of a child is likely to
find it more convenient to apply to the Central Authority of the country of the child's habitual residence, thus
avoiding the difficulties of long distance communication and travel).
135. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 29; see also Anton, supra note 89, at 545.
136. See Anton, supra note 89, at 547.
137. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 8(a).
138. See id. art. 8(b).
139. See id. art. 8(c).
140. See id. art. 8(d).
141. See Ud art. 8(c).
142. See d. art. 8(0.
143. Id. art. 8(g).
144. See Anton, supra note 89, at 552 (describing both the applicant's and the defendant abductor's burden
of proof in a Hague Convention action).
145. See id
146. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603()(1)(A) (West 1988) (requiring the Petitioner to show wrongful removal or
retention based on a breach ofcustody rights "by a preponderance of the evidence"). This is a section of the United
States' codification of the Hague Convention. The Convention is enacted into the law in England as the Child
Abduction and Custody Act of 1985. See Child Abduction and Custody Act, 1985 (Eng.). In New Zealand, the
Convention is enacted under the Guardianship Amendment Act of 1991. See Guardianship Amendment Act, 1991
(N.Z,). Australia enacted the Treaty under the Family Law Amendment Act of 1983. Seel983 Amendments to
Family Law Act, 1975(Austl.).
147. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 14.
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The Convention recommended the use of a model application form to the
original Contracting States, and though its use is not mandatory, the completion of
the model form ensures that all the required information is provided, accelerating
the processing of the application.148 A Central Authority may require that an
application be accompanied by "a written authorization empowering it to act on the
behalf of the applicant, or to designate a representative to so act. ' 149 Unless all
requirements are met, the Central Authority is not bound to accept an application,
but refusal to accept an application and the reasons for refusal must be
communicated to the applicant or the requesting Contracting State.15°
E. Exceptions to the Mandatory Return of the Internationally Abducted Child
Perhaps realizing the inflexibility of a rule that denies judges any discretion in
ordering the return of a child to the state of his or her habitual residence,151 the
drafters of the Hague Convention created several exceptions converting the
mandatory return provision into a discretionary one. 52 The exceptions to the
mandatory return of a child enumerated in the Hague Convention are sometimes
referred to as the "discretionary exceptions" because proof of the existence of any
of these exceptions does not mandate the return of the child, but rather "allows a
judge to avoid the compulsory return of an abducted child .... ,,1's These
enumerated exceptions include the following: (1) the "grave risk of harm"
eiception,'m (2) the "consent" or "acquiescence" exception, 55 (3) the "child's
objection" exception, 5 6 (4) the "settled in new environment after one year"
148. See Anton, supra note 89, at 548 (describing the optional model application form prepared by a sub-
committee of the Hague Convention but not fully reviewed at the Convention).
149. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 28.
150. See id. an. 27.
151. See Horstmeyer, supra note 3, at 128 (remarking that the drafters of the Hague Convention realized the
-impracticality of denying judges any discretion in ordering the return of a child).
152. WilliamM.Hilton, The Limitatonson Art. 13(b)ofthe Convention on the CivilAspects ofInternatllonal
Child Abduction, 11 AM. J. FAM. L.139 (1997), available at <http.//www.hiltonhouse.com/articles/Art_13
(b)_limiLtxt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
153. Harper, supra note 59, at 259. But see James D. Garbolino, Analyzing the "Grave Risk" Defense, In
SEt.ECrE GOOD PRACTICES IN INTERNAIIONAL FAMILY ABDUCION CASES (Linda K. Girdner &Patricia M. Hoff
eds., 1998) (visited June 29, 2000) <http.//www.hiltonhouse.con-articleslGrave.isk-defense.txt> (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (characterizing the "grave risk" exception as a "defense"). The Interchangeable
use of exceptio.ns and defenses is appropriate because the only defenses available to an abducting parent are the
discretionary exceptions.
154. SeeHague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13(b) (provding that thejudicial or administrative body of the
Contracting State is not bound to order the return of the child if such a return would expose the child to a "grave
risk" of "physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation").
155. See U art. 13(a) (declaring that the court of the Contracting State is not required to return the child if
the aggrieved parent "had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention").
156. Seeid, art 13, 3 (retainingjudicial discretion toreturn the childifthe court "finds that the child objects
to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of [the
child's] views").
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exception,'" and (5) the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" exception.15
The descriptive term "discretionary" is also appropriate because it differentiates
these exceptions from the other, inherently non-discretionary exceptions based upon
whether the child has reached the age of sixteen, 59 or whether the left-behind parent
actually exercised his or her custody rights at the time the abducting parent removed
the child from the habitual residence.'60
While the parent petitioning for the return of the child must prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the removal or retention of the child is wrongful, the
abducting parent, hoping for a denial of that return, must also prove the "consent"
or "acquiescence" exception, the "settled in new environment after one year"
exception, or the "child's objection" exception by a preponderance of evidence. 161
However, when an abducting parent claims a "grave risk of harm" or a "human
rights and fundamental freedoms" exception, the proof must be clear and
convincing.' 62 Although each of the discretionary exceptions are discussed briefly,
the "grave risk of harm" exception applies to the focus of this Comment-domestic
violence and child abuse. Accordingly, the "grave risk of harm" exception, as well
as its application in international cases is discussed in greater detail.'63
1. The Grave Risk of Harm Exception
The exception that involves the most judicial discretion 6' and litigation' 6' is
commonly known as the "Article 13(b)" or "grave risk of harm" exception.166
Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or
administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the
157. See dart. 12(mandatingthatthejudicial oradministrativeauthority ofthe ContractingStateretur the
wrongfully removed or retained child "unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new
environment").
158. ld. art 20 (allowing for the refusal to return the child if such a return "would not be permitted by the
fundamental principles" of the Contracting State "relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms").
159. See i4 art 4.
160. See id. art. 3(b).
161. See Copertino. supra note 58, at 728.
162. See42U.S.C. § 11603(d}{2)(A)-(B)(1988)(providingthattheburdenofproofisplacedonanabducting
parent under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, the United States's codification of the Hague
Convention). The United Kingdom requires "clear and compelling" evidence of a "grave risk of harm" exception
under its codification of the Hague Convention, the Child Abduction and Custody Act of 1985. See In re MandJ
(1999) (U..), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6, 2000) <http'//www.hilton
house.conIcases/Re..M&J_UKtxt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter M and J].
163. See infra notes 321-516 and accompanying text (discussing of international child abduction case law
involving the "grave risk of har" exception).
164. See Harper, supra note 59, at 259.
165. See Horstmeyer, supra note 3, at 127.
166. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13(b).
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return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its
return establishes that... (b) there is a grave risk that his or her return
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise
place the child in an intolerable situation.167
Unfortunately, the Treaty does not define "grave risk of harm."'(68 A plain
reading could mean that all that is required for the application of the exception is a
possibility of harm, or that the risk, rather than the harm itself, is substantial.'6 This
interpretation of the exception presents a danger of broad application by exceeding
its intended scope to include "transient or reparable harm." 170 In other words, a
broad interpretation allows an abducting parent to defend his or her action based on
the existence of any condition in the child's habitual residence with any potential of
placing the child in danger of harm. 171 The drafters of the Hague Convention instead
advocated that the exception be narrowly construed to avoid the exception from
swallowing the Treaty's primary goal, which is to return children to their habitual
residence. ' Under the Convention, the "grave risk of harm" exception is intended
to allow for the protection of the child from only serious irreparable harm or the
danger of such harm, not harm to the child's economic or educational prospects.1 73
Whether viewed positively or negatively, each Contracting State has the liberty
to construct its own interpretation of the "grave risk of harm" exception. 74 What
constitutes an "intolerable situation" for the child is subject to interpretation. 75 For
example, the judicial authority of Ireland found that a father's irresponsible
management of the family's financial affairs allowed for the denial of the return of
the children under Article 13(b).17 6 In another case, a French court denied the return
of a child based upon the characterization of Los Angeles pollution as an
167. Id.
168. See Harper, supra note 59, at 260.
169. See id. (interpreting the "grave risk of harm" exception as only requiring the possibility of harm to the
child be great and not requiring the harm to be severe).
170. See Garbolino, supra note 153 (presenting a case in which the risk of the disruption of a three-year-old
child's bonding with his motherwas found to meet the "grave risk"exception and thus thwarted the father's attempt
to have the child returned under the Hague Convention). The author characterized the holding of this decision as
being based on too broad of an interpretation of the "grave risk" exception. See ih
171. See id.
172. SeePerezReportsupra note 11, 34 (reporting the intention of the Hague Convention was that Article
13(b) exceptions be applied "only so far as they go and no further," to prevent the Convention from becoming "a
dead letter").
173. See . 116.
174. See Harper, supra note 59, at 260.
175. See Ud,
176. See!& at 261 (detailing a case heard in Ireland, PF v. MF, 1992 IR. [1992] LR. 390, in which a father's
poor management of money forced the family to move at least nine times either because of eviction or to avoid
eviction).
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"intolerable situation" under Article 13(b). 1"7 Although these examples are aberrant
cases of international child abduction,178 they demonstrate the controversial nature
of some denials under the Hague Convefition and perhaps the reason why such
denials may negatively impact the reciprocity and cooperation desired among the
Contracting States of the Convention.
Despite the variations in defining the "grave risk of harm" exception among
Contracting States, international decisions are based, for the most part, on a narrow
interpretation of the exception.'" Although the precise terms used by the various
Contracting States of the Convention may be different, each state seems to capture
the intent of the Convention by narrowly applying the Article 13(b) exception. For
example, a U.S. federal circuit court found the "grave risk of harm" exception to be
applicable in only two situations: (1) "where [the] return of [a] child puts [the] child
in imminent danger prior to [the] resolution of [a] custody dispute, for example,
returning [the] child to [a] zone of war, famine or disease" or (2) where the court of
the child's habitual residence is "incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate
protection" in instances of "serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional
dependence"'1 In another U.S. case, the determination of the "grave risk of harm"
exception began by focusing on the child's habitual residence rather than upon the
individuals in that environment.' 8' The test for the existence of the "grave risk of
harm" is whether the place of habitual residence has an atmosphere of "'internal
strife' or unrest as to place the child at risk:"1
In England, the harm is characterized as "an intolerable situation," and the fact
that the petitioning parent is a drug user, homeless, or on welfare is not a sufficient
basis to deny the child's return."s An English court also found a "grave risk of
harm" must "be more than an ordinary risk" of psychological harm anticipated when
a child is taken by one parent from the other.184 Furthermore, even a past history of
child neglect is not enough to prevent a return order by some English courts18s
177. SeegenerallyCourtAwards$12.5MillioninDamagesinlnternational ChildAbduction Case: Largest
U.S. Verdict on Record, BuS. WIRM (uly 6, 1993), available in WESTLAW, BWIREPLUS (describing a U.S.
court's award of$12.5 million in general and punitive damages to compensate forthe injury to a father's health and
for other legal costs involved in contesting the mother's wrongful removal and subsequent denial of return by a
French court).
178. See Harper, supra note 59, at 261-62 (acknowledging that these cases "are anomalies" and describing
the "grave risk of harm" exception as "an ethnocentical judge's tool" by which judges can make determinations
based upon their own cultures and bias); Silberman, supra note 51, at 32 (discussing varying ideas of "family
values"and pointing out that return decisions could be easily biased depending upon the Contracting State's view
of, for instance, homosexuality or ofthe status of women as compared to men).
179. See Hilton, supra note 152.
180. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
181. See Tahanv. Duquette, 613 A.2d486. 489 (NJ. 1992).
182. Id.
183. See Gunsburg, supra note 11, atl 14.
184. In re A (a minor) (1987) (UM), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6, 2000)
<http.//www.hiltonhouse. com/caesffnra..uk.txt> (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer).
185. See fi.
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Similarly, in Australia, not only must the situation be "intolerable" to qualify
under the Article 13(b) exception, but the harm must be more than just "the grave
risk of any physical or psychological harm."1 86 The potential harm, whether physical
or psychological, must be of "a substantial nature."'18 Australian courts ruled that
the best place for determining whether there is a "grave risk of harm" is in the state
of the child's habitual residence.'88
However, a distinction is made in Australia between returning the child to the
Contracting State of the child's habitual residence and returning the child to the
wronged parent in the habitual residence.'89 This distinction is made operable by the
means of an "undertaking. ' ' 19° A child returned to his or her habitual residence does
not necessarily need to be returned to the petitioning parent, particularly if doing so
would place the child at risk; the child can be returned in the custody of the
abducting parent or a third party, with the left-behind parent providing for the
186. Ottens v. Ottens (1988) (Austl.), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6,2000)
<http'./www.hiltonhouseomteases/Otens aus.txt> (emphasis added) (copy on file with The Transnatlonal
Lawyer).
187. Id. (empahsis added).
188. See Murray (1993XAusi.), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6, 2000)
<httpllwww.hiltonhouse.com/cases/Murray-aus.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (hereinafter
Murray] (providingacopy ofan Australianjudgment against a mother who wrongfully removed her lhreue children
from New Zealand to Australia). This case involves accusations of domestic violence and is further discussed at
infra notes 345-360 and accompanying text.
189. See kd. (pointing out thatthe children areproposedtoberetumed toNewZealand, the children's habitual
residence, but not to the custody of the father who is alleged to be a violent gang member).
190. An undertaking is a concept borrowed from the law of contracts which means "a promise unsupported
by consideration' given by the petitioning parent to make the return of children easier and to provide for the
"necessities, such as a roof over their head [sic] and adequate maintenance" Lentr from Catherine W. Brown,
Assistant Legal Adviser, Consular Affairs of U.S. Dep't of State, to Michael Nicholls, Lord Chancellor's
Department Child Abduction Unit (Aug. 10, 1995), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House
<http'./www.lltonhouse.comfarticleslUnderaidng.RpLtxt> (copy on file with The Transnatlonal Lawyer)
Ihereinafter Letter from U.S. Central Authority to England's Central Authority]. Undertakings have been used by
the courts of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in cases brought under the Hague Convention. See
id. The scope of undertakings has been a controversial issue between the United States and England. See LORD
CHANCELLOR's CHILD ABDUCTION UNIT, CENRAL AIuHORITY FOR ENGLAND & WALES, REPOF OF HAoUE
CONVENTION OPERATIONS (Nov. 1995), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House
<http'J/www.hiltonhouse.com/article/UndertakingRpt.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
[hereinafterENLIlsHUNDERTAMNoSREPoRT] (providing results ofobservationsby Michael Nicholls on thebehalf
of England's Child Abduction Unit in relation to the enforcement of undertakings by U.S. courts). In the United
States, undertakings ar called "stipulations."See id, at n.2. The U.S. Department ofState may not require state and
federal courts to recognize undertakings, but the Department of State can encourage the enforcement of limited
undertakings. See Letter from U.S. Central Authority to England's Central Authority, supra. The United States
considers examples of limited undertakings to be a provision for return airfare or a requirement that the child be
returned in the custody of the abducting parent. See id. The United States found the provisions of an automobile,
school expenses, weekly maintenance payments, and medical and dental insurance expenses to exceed the scope
of an undertaking, the purpose of which is to provide necessities until the courts of the habitual residence make a
custody decision. See i&
412
The Transnational Lawyer / VoL 13
necessities of the child.191 Moreover, an Australian court found that to conclude that
a mother and her children could not be protected in any one of the Contracting
States of the Hague Convention "would be presumptuous and offensive in the
extreme.i'
192
In a like manner, Israeli courts define a "grave risk of harm" as a "substantial
harm of a nature that would be more serious than the harm caused as a result of
severing the tie with the custodial parent." 93 These courts consider issues such as
the "best interests" of the child to be independent of a "grave risk of harm" in its
determination.' 94 Under Israeli law, absent an exception enumerated by the
Convention, the child's "best interests" are addressed by the courts of the child's
habitual residence when the petitioned court orders the return of the child to that
country. 95 The rationale is that the "best interests of the child" are better determined
in the country of the child's habitual residence where courts have ready access to
evidence that demonstrates the nature of the child's environment prior to the
abduction.196
The relatively recent decisions in international child abduction cases regarding
if or when domestic violence and/or child abuse meets the "grave risk of harm"
exception are significant to the focus of this Comment.' 97 Perhaps the unrealized
prevalence or notoriety of domestic violence and child abuse at the time of the
drafting of the Hague Convention198 explains why these issues are not mentioned ih
the Treaty itself or in the reports of the Convention. However, follow-up meetings
by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conventiont" reveal that questions are at
least raised regarding the return of children to homes where domestic violence and
191. See ENLISH UNDEPTAKINS REPoRT, supra note 190. Undertakings are used in cases involving an
Article 13(b) defense as a means of mitigating a "grave risk of harm" to the child if the order to return were
unconditional. See id. Undertakings in these situations appropriately include temporary provision providing
necessities for the child and either the abducting parent or a third-party custodian until the court of the habitual
residence can make a custody decision. See idU The U.S. position is that once the grave risk of harm is proved by
clear and convincing evidence, extensive undertakings are less appropriate than simply denying the petition for
return. See id. But see Blondin v. Blondin, 189 F3d 240, 248-50 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring that the District Court
"considerthe availability oftemporary arrangements thatwouldhonorthe Convention's mandate"'toretm children
to theirhtabitual residence while still protecting them from thegrave risk of harm); see also Turner v. Frowein, 752
A.2d 955, 961 (Conn. 2000) (ordering the trial court to fully evaluate the "placement options andlegal safeguarde"
available if the child was returned to the habitual residence).
192. See Murray, supra note 188.
193. See Gunsburg, supra note 11, 116.
194. See id.[ 17.
195. See id.
196. See Robinson v. Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (D. Colo. 1997).
197. See infra notes 321-516 and accompanying text (discussing international child abduction case law
involving domestic violence and child abuse).
198. See Bruch, supra note 14, at 105.
199. The Permanent Bureau of the Conference is not mentioned in the Hague Conference itself. However,
the Perez Report, the recognized official reporter of the Hague Convention, states that the Permanent Bureau
functions "to furnish to interested persons any information desired concerning the work of the Conference." See
Perez Report. supra note 11, [5.
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child abuse are proven to have occurred.m° Indeed, the question raised is whether
such an atmosphere of violence and abuse constitutes a "grave risk of harm," and
therefore should be recognized as an exception to the Hague Convention's
mandatory return of the child.o
2. The "Consent" or "Acquiescence" Exception
If a parent consents to his or her child moving to another country before the
relocation, or acquiesces to removal of the child after an abduction, the removal is
not considered to be wrongful, and the judge has the discretion to grant or deny the
return of the child.= The difference between "consent" and "acquiescence" is a
matter of timing.y Consent means that the left-behind parent agreed to the removal
before the removal of the child occurred, and acquiescence indicates acceptance,
either "active" or "passive," after the removal of the child has occurred. Unless
the left-behind parent knew that removal or retention of the child was unlawful and
knew generally of his or her rights against the other parent, acquiescence is not
recogrized.2n5 Some courts advocate that, in the absence of unusual circumstances,
200. See MEEIMG REPORTS OP THE DAILY SESSIONS OF THE SECOND SPECIAL COMMISSION MEETING To
STUDY THOPERAIONOFTHEHAGUECONVENIONONTHECIVILASPEC OFINTERNATIONALCHLDn DU ON,
available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6, 2000) <http://www.hiltonhouse.com/artdcles/
Meetingjrpt-jan93.txt> (copy on file with The Tmnsnational Lawyer) [hereinafter M G REPOrrs oN HAGOU
CoNvErmONEECACY] (reporting a question raised by one expert at the meeting asking whether the Article 13(b)
exception might be used in cases where the child has been a victiii of sexual abuse). Ireland mentions a case in
which one of its courts ordered the return the children on the basis that "any domestic violence would pose a severe
psychological risk to the children." Id. at 12. Although the question ofwhetherdomestio violence and/or child abuse
should be considered under the"grave risk of har' exception is not answered definitively, many experts shun the
use ofthe exception to protect a child from a particular parent, instead suggesting that the more appropriate question
is whether the childis placed at graverisk simply by returning the child to the habitual residence and not necessarily
the left-behind parent. See id.
201. Il at 11-12.
202. See Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13(a) (providing that the judicial or authoritative authority is
not bound to order the return of the child if the left-behind parent "hats] consented to or subsequently acquiesced
in the removal or retention ).
203. In reA andAnother (1992) (CA.), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6,2000)
<http://www.hitton house.com/cases/Inrea2uk.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter In
reAandAnother].
204. Active acquiescence is demonstrated "either by express words or by conduct." Id. Moreover, either the
abducting party must have believed that the left-behind parent accepted removal, or the left-behind parent acted
inconsistently with an intention to insist on legal rights. See id. Passive acquiescence is inferred "from silence and
inactivity for a sufficient period [of time] in circumstances where different conduct was to be expected on the part
of the aggrieved parent." Id. A letter from a husband to his wife, who abducted their children from Israel to
California, provides an example of express acquiescence:
I would never take Esther from you-from her mother. I am willing to sign whatever you ask me to, so
that you know you both would not be hindered from leaving the country.. If you want your freedom,
I do not want to stand in the way of your happiness.
District Attorney v. Officer (1996) (CaL), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6, 2000)
<http:/lwww.hiltonhouse.comlcasesOfficerCa.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
205. See In re A and Another, supra note 203, at 2.
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only active acquiescence be allowed in the first one-year period from the time of
abduction, but that active or passive acquiescence be presumed after one year, unless
the affected parent shows extraordinary circumstances thatprovenon-acceptance. 206
When acquiescence is raised in defense by the abducting party, litigation focuses on
the totality of the circumstances either pointing to acceptance of the removal or
showing opposition to the removal of the child.3 7
3. The "Child's Objection" Exception
The second paragraph of Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention provides the
"child's objection" exception as follows: "[tihe judicial or administrative authority
may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to
being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of [the child's] views."' Although the drafters of the
Hague Convention were unable to agree on a specific age of maturity, all agreed that
consideration of the views of the child is "absolutely necessary" and, in fact, "may
be conclusive." 9 Indeed, the views of children that are victims of domestic violence
and subsequent child abduction may provide the court with valuable information
that could prove to be conclusive in determining whether the child is at "grave risk"
if returned to the left-behind parent.
Conversely, opponents of this exception claim that it (1) allows the requested
court to determine issues of custody rather than following the mandates of the
Hague Convention by returning the child to his or her habitual residence where
those determinations are to be made; (2) gives the child, rather than the judge, the
discretion to determine whether he or she wants to return; (3) involves the views of
a child, which are subject to greater parental influence than the views of an adult;
(4) opens the door for broad interpretation by judges, and therefore subjects the
exception to "judicial abuse"; and (5) places the child at the center of a dilemma by
asking the child to, in effect, choose between the abducting parent and the left-
behind parent.210 Children may be interviewed by a child counselor, by the judge in
206. See H v. H (1996) (U.K.). available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6, 2000)
<hUp.//www.hiltonhouse.comcas-llvh.uk> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafterHv. HI
207. The following cases center upon the "acquiescence?' exception: In re A andAnother, supra note 203;
H v. H, supra note 206; Hemard v. Hemard (1995) (N.D. Tx), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House
(visited July 6, 2000) http.//www.hiltonhouse.comtases/Hemard_fed.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) [hereinafterHemard];andLeibovitzv. Leibovitz(1993X sr),avallableinWiliiamM.HiltonHiltnHouse
(visited July 6. 2000) <http'/lwww.hiltonhouse.comlcases/Libovitzjmel.txt> (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
208. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13(b).
209. Perez Report, supra note 11, 131.
210. See Nanos, supra note 58, at 446-47 (discussing criticisms of the child's objection defense). See
generally Id. (focusing on the "child's objection" exception and providing a thorough analysis).
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camera, or both in order to provide objective evidence without the influence of
either parent.21
4. The "Settled in New Environment After One Year" Exception
The presiding judge in an international child abduction case brought under the
Hague Convention may opt to deny the return of the child if both of the following
conditions are met: (1) more than one year has passed since a wrongful removal or
retention of a child, and (2) the abducting parent can prove by a preponderance of
evidence212 that the child is "now settled in the new environment."2 3 The
Convention places a one-year time limit for the initiation of an action for the return
of the child because the drafters felt that the failure to bring an action within the one-
year time frame indicates that the aggrieved parent "had acquiesced." 2 4
Furthermore, the drafters concluded that after the passage of one year, the child is
likely to have "assimilated into his or her new surroundings, 215 and uprooting the
child would be detrimental. 16 The "settled" exception is a compromise that softens
the inflexible one-year time limit for bringing an action for the return of a child, but
still allows for the protection of a child from another uprooting if the child proves
to be settled in a new environment. 2 17
Once a child becomes settled in the new environment, a decision to return the
child to his or her habitual residence cannot be made without exploring the merits
of the custody rights2 18 This does not mean that a determination of custody is made
under the Hague Convention; it means that a determination is made regarding which
country has the jurisdiction to make a custody decision. 9 Thus, resolving custody
211. See Robinson v. Robinson, 983 . Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Colo. 1997) (considering the child's views,
including (I) a letter to the presiding judge from the child at the suggestion of a counselor and (2) a conversation
in chambers without counsel or family present).
212. In the United States, the burden of proof in asserting a "settled in the new environment after one year"
exception is by a preponderance of the evidence.See42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(B) (West 1988). Siniluly, another
court describes the burden of proof as "substantial:' Zuker v. Andrews, 2 F. Supp. 2d 134, 141 (D. Mass. 1998).
213. Hague Convention,supra note4, art. 12 (mandating that "[t]hejudicial or administrative authority, even
where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the
preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled
in its new environment.").
214. Copertino, supra note 58, at 729-30.
215. Id.
216. See Robinson, 983 F. Supp. at 1345.
217. See Perez Report, supra note 11, 1 109.The Perez Report "is recognized as the official commentary to
the Convention:' Silberman, supra note 51, at 11 n.8.
218. Seei. at 107 (explainingthat"afterachildhas become settled in [the] new environment, [thechild's]
return should take place only after an examination of the merits of the custody rights... something which is outside
the scope of the Convention.").
219. See Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413,421 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (finding that a five-year old child and
an eight-year old childwere"settledin theirnew environent,"but emphasizing that "It]he [c]ourt's decision (was]
not a decision on who should have custody of the children. .. [but] that the custody decision should be made in the
United States [the country to which the children were abducted]:').
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issues in the place that is most closely connected to the evidence of the child's care
is the goal justifying both the prompt return of the abducted child to his or her
habitual residence and the denial of return once the child is "settled in [a] new
environment." '
Although the Hague Convention itself does not detail the criteria by which the
child's settlement can be proved,221 indicators of the child's settlement can be
identified in international child abduction case law.222 For a child to be settled in a
new environment requires "nothing less than substantial evidence of the child's
significant connections to the new country."22 Significant connections are
moderated by both the passage of time and the age of the child involved. Alone,
time does not determine whether a child is settled in the environment, but time is
required to develop the type of meaningful ties required for tribunals to find that a
child is settled in a new environment.225 Time is necessary for the formation of
friendships and the participation in church, school, and community
programs-factors that are considered significant in determining whether a child is
settled. 2 6 In addition, the age of the child affects the degree to which the child can
220. See Robinson, 983 E Supp. at 1344 (discussing that the purpose of having custody matters decided in
the jurisdiction where the child is "settled" is to have ready access to evidence of the child's care, training, and
relationships).
221. See Perez Report, supra note 11, 109.
222. For examples of how various HagueConvention countries determine whetherthe child is "well settled,,
see In re Collopy, available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http:/Iwww.hilton
house.com/eaesCallopy.colorado.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Collopy];
Fjeldheim v Feldhein (1995) (W. D. Mich), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6,2000)
<http://www.hiltonhouse.comcases/Fjeldhe'an-fed-dlst-nptxt> (copy of file with The Transnational Lawyer)
[hereinafter Fjeldheim]; Meredith v. Basdaras (1996) (Greece), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House
(visited July 6,2000) <http://www.hiltonhouse.comtcases/Meredithgr.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) [hereinafterMeredith]; Robinson v. Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Colo. 1997); Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959
F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Zuker v. Andrews, 2 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D. Mass. 1998).
223. Robinson, 983 F. Supp. at 1344.
224. See id. at 1345.
225. See id. (declaring that "it is not the mere passage of time which determines [settlement in the new
environment] or the Convention would have so provided.").
226. See Collopy, supra note222 (denying the return of a 20-month oldchildbasedo n the "settled in the new
environment" exception, supported by evidence that the child "bonded with the extended family," was baptized in
the new location, and formed associations with other children that her mother provided care for as a nanny);
Meredith, supra note 222 (describing "settled in the new environment" factors such as the fact that two children,
age seven and age nine, spoke fluent Greek, attended afull year of school, and formed warm social and familial ties,
but also stressing the fact that the mother did not file aHague Convention action for thereturn of the children until
two years after their removal as important to thedecision of the courtnottoreturn thechildren to theUnited States);
see also Robinson, 983 F. Supp. at 1345 (supporting that the formation of meaningful friendships and involvement
in school, extra-curricular, community, religious, and social activities am important factors for a determination of
"settled in the new environment"); see also Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. at416 (determining thatbecause the motherrented
her own house, the children attended the same school and church, and had formed close bonds with friends and
relatives that the children were "settled"); see also Zuker, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 141 (finding that a four-year old child
who attended a day cam center, went to playmates' houses andbirthday parties, and formed closerelationships with
teachers and grandmother was settled).
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interact with the community to form the ties that constitute being "settled. 227 The
child must be old enough to form meaningful friendships and connections to the new
environment.2 The left-behind parent who wishes to refute evidence of friendships
and social ties to the community of the new environment must offer significant
evidence that the child is still substantially connected to the country from which he
or she was taken.m The time period for a Hague Convention action based on this
exception is potentially longer than most other Hague Convention proceedings
because of the type of evidence required to prove that a child is "settled in [the] new
environment."' 0
Controversy involving the "settled in the new environment" exception centers
not only on what constitutes "settled," but also on when the one-year time period
begins to run. Although the Treaty states that the one year time lapse begins on
"the date of the wrongful removal or retention,"' 32 most courts and experts in the
field of international child abduction advocate that the timeperiod be tdlled, pending
the location of the child, in order to prevent abducting parents from defeating a
Hague Convention action by hiding the child for the first year following the child's
removal or retention? 3 Strictly limiting the permissibility of bringing a Hague
Convention action to one year from the removal or retention of the child seems
unfair if the aggrieved parent does not know the location of the child and is therefore
unable to determine the appropriate jurisdiction in which to bring an action.2m
227. See Robinson, 983 F. Supp. at 1345.
228. See id
229. See Zuker, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 141 (determining that a four-year old was "settled in his new environment"
based on "both substantial and persuasive' evidence including day care attendance, friendships with playmates, and
frequent visits with his grandmother and stressing that the aggrieved parent did not offer any contrary evidence).
230. Perez Report, supra note 11,1 109.
231. See opertinosupmnote58,at729-30(discussingthe "oneyearstatute ofli i ation[s]"asa"weakness
oftheHague Convention!'ifsuch alimitation wouldallow the abducting parent to"conceal the location ofthe child
for long periods of time in the hope of foiling the petitioner's opportunities" for acquiring the return of the child).
232. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12.
233. SeeHemanidsupmnote2O7(concludingthat"[t]hetimeforcmmncingproceedngseforethejudcial
authority was tolled pending the location of the child"); see also Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413,420 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (agreeing with the Henard decision that the one year period be .'tolled pending the location of the
child,"' and therefore, despite the passage of over one year, "the clock may have run less than a year"); see
Copertino, supra note 58, at 731 (advocating that "the statute oflimitations begin to run only when the petitioner
has concrete knowledge as to the whereabouts of the child and the abductor"); cf Robinson v. Robinson, 983 .
Supp. 1339,1344 n.4 (D. Colo. 1997) (favoring the position that negotiations also should be tolled from the one-
year period).
234. See Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. at 415 n.3.
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5. The "Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" Exception
The "human rights and fundamental freedoms" exception:2 5 provides that "[t]he
return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would
not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. ' z 6 If the exception is
interpreted broadly, rather than narrowly as the drafters of the Convention intended,
the exercise of the exception could undermine the very goal of promptly returning
internationally abducted children to their habitual residence3 7 However, no cases
are reported in which the court of a Contracting State has refused to return a child
based on this exception. s Thus, the exception is "somewhat of a paper tiger.' '239
Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department explains that "the Convention might
never have been adopted without [the human rights and fundamental freedoms
exception]."m Characterized simply, this exception is merely a "safety valve" that
allows the requested Contracting State to refuse to return a child if that return
violates the laws of that Contracting State.2 t Even the staunch supporters of the
Article 20 exception believe that it should be used only in "extreme circumstances"
in which "the return of a child would utterly shock the conscience of the court or
offend all notions of due process. '' 4Z Experts of the Hague Convention agree that
courts should rely on the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" exception only
when the return of the child "violate[s] an actual law of the requested country rather
235. The "human rights and fundamental freedoms" exception is also described as the "public policy
exception;" See Dana R. Rivers, The HagueInternational ChildAbduction Convention and the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act: Closing Doors to the ParentAbductor, 2 TRANSNAT'LLAw. 589, 627 (1989).
236. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 20.
237. See Lame Cardin, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction As
Applied to Non-Signatory Nations: Gening to Square One, 20 Hous. . INT'L L. 141, 153 (1997). In fact, this
"public policy clause" ofArticle 20 was the subject ofdebate and adopted only afterits language was amended. See
Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 51 FED. REo. 10
510 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention]. Initially, the provision stated that "Contracting
States may reserve the right not to return the child when such return would be manifestly incompatible with the
fundamental principles of the law relating to the family and children in the State addressed." ld,
238. SeeSilbermansupranote51,at29 (assertingthatunsurprisingly"noreportedcaseshaverefusedretum
under Article 20"); see also Cam v. Sher, 687 A.2d 354, 361 (NJ. 1996) (denying an Article 20 exception to
returning a child to Spain, reasoning that delay in court proceedings does not mean that the court is "unwilling to
addrese" the problem, and concluding that Spanish courts did not deny procedural due process); see also Parsons
v. Styger, (1989) (Can.), available in William K Hilton, Hilton House (visited July 6, 2000) <http://www.hilton
hous.concases/Prsons.cdn> (copy on file with The Trnsnational Lawyer) (denying an Article 20 exception
involving an alleged violation of sections 6(l) and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by which
"every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in, and leave Canada" by reasoning that "a Canadian citizen
has no more right to remain in Canada in defiance of the Hague Convention than a citizen to defeat a Canadian
court's extradition order to a treaty co-signatory member:').
239. Cardin, supra note 237, at 153.
240. Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention, supra note 237, at 10510.
241. See Cardin, supra note 237, at 152.
242. Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention, supra note 237, at 10510.
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than merely [being] incompatible with the country's policies or culture. ' '2 3
Furthermore, the exception should not be "used any more frequently than it does in
its own domestic judicial decisions."" Otherwise, the provision would be
"discriminatory in itself" and therefore a violation of the fundamental principles of
the laws of most Contracting States.245
R Criticism of the Hague Convention
As the Hague Convention grows into adulthood as an international treaty and
more Hague Convention actions are brought under its governance, signs of both its
efficacies and deficiencies are surfacing.2" Criticism of the Convention includes (1)
the minority status of the Convention's geographical reach,2 7 (2) non-compliance
among Contracting States,,2  (3) the inconsistencies in the implementation of the
Convention among Contracting States,249 (4) the narrowness of the focus of the
243. Dorothy Carol Daigle, Due ProcessRights of Parents and Children in International ChildAbductions:
AnExaminationoftheHague Convention andits Eceptions, 26 VAND.J.'TRANSNAT'LL 865, 879 (1993). See also
Perez Report, supra note 11, 118 (explaining that even manifest incompatibility with the requested state's
principles is not enough to allow denial of return under the human rights and fundamental freedom exception, but
rather "that the fundamental principles of the requested State concerning the subject matter of the Convention do
not permit it"); Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention, supra note 237, at 10510 (advising that Article 20 not be
invoked "as a vehicle for litigating custody on the merits or for passing judgment on the political system of the
country from which the child was removed").
244. Daigle, supra note 243, at 879.
245. See Perez Report, supra note 11,1 118.
246. See Bruch, supra note 14, at 102 (describing the Convention as a "teenager," and, "as that analogy
implies," discussing the new problems arising at this stage of its growth).
247. See Copertino, supra note 58, at 732 (acknowledging that only 15 of the 171 countries of the world are
party to the Convention, and thus "the number of 'haven states'" forintemational child abductors is fargreater than
the number of Contracting States to the Hague Convention); see also Starr, supra note 1, at 793 (determining that
"[rloughly three-fourths of the world's countries are not signatories to the Hague Convention").
248. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No 105-277, §
2803, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-846 (1998) (mandating that "[b]eginning 6 months after the date of the enactment of
this Act and every 12 months thereafter during the period ending September 30, 1999, the Secretary of State shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the compliance with the provisions of the [Hague]
Convention"); see also Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (viSited Feb. 13, 2000) <http.//travel.state.gov/compliance.html> (copy on file with The
TransnationalLawyer) [hereinafter CongressionalReport on Compliance with the Hague Convention] (responding
to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998 and reporting to the U. S.
Congress "on compliance by signatory countries with the Hague Convention"). This report identifies Austria,
Honduras, Mauritius, Mexico, and Sweden as "those countries that the [State] Department has found to be in
violation of their obligations under the Convention:' Id. Mauritius, for example, refused to return a child to her
habitual residence because "[t]hough Mauritius has acceded to that convention, the provisions of the whole or part
of that convention have not been implemented in our national laws." Pierce v. Pierce (1998) (Mauritlus), available
in WilliamM. Hilton, Hilton House (visitedluly 6,2000) <http/www.hiltonhouse.com/cases/PierceMaurtus.txt>
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Pierce].
. 249. These inconsistencies include the following: (1) inconsistencies in the degree of proof required before
considering the denial of a child based on a discretionary exception to the Convention. See H. Wayne Etliott,
Beyond Reach? InternationalAbductionRemedies, 4S.C.LAW 18, 21 (1992), (2) inconsistencies in the designation
of who bears the cost of a Hague Convention proceeding. See Silberman, supra note 51, at 14, and (3) the
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Convention,25° and (5) the inability to enforce a civil decision based on the
Convention in another Contracting State.asl The following discussion of each of
these criticisms of the Hague Convention reveals general agreement in the
identification of the problems with the implementation of the Convention, but also
reveals diversity in opinions of how to correct these problems.
1. The Minority Status of the Convention's Geographical Reach
Only one quarter of the world's countries are party to the Hague Convention. 25
The efficacy of the Convention in deterring international child abduction depends
on increasing the number of countries participating in the prompt return of abducted
children to their habitual residence. It also depends on the concomitant decrease in
the number of non-Hague Convention countries, which may serve as "safe havens"
for child abductors since they do not have the governance of the Hague
Convention. The minority status of countries participating in the Hague
Convention may be a result of the diverse legal and social systems of the world's
nations, some of which are unsympathetic to the goals of the Convention ?5
Moreover, some of the world's countries may not participate in the Hague
Convention because they are unable to fund such an enterprise or simply because
they do not know about the Convention. 5
Ironically, problems associatedwith the drive to increase the number of
Contracting States to the Convention are also emerging. As the number of countries
acceding to the Convention increases, so do the number of countries ill-prepared to
implement the Convention's obligations?56 The degree of insufficient preparation
by some of the dountries that recently ratified or acceded to the Convention is
somewhat shocking. For example, some of these countries failed to designate a
Central Authority as required by Article 6.0 7 More disconcerting are the reports that
interpretation of the discretionary exceptions of the Hague Convention. See Copertino, supra note 58, at 735.
250. See Starr, supra note 1, at 829 (characterizing the "extremely narrow" interpretation of the Hague
Convention as "jurisdictional" because that interpretation "addresses only the quarrel between parents" and"hardly
considers the child's point of view").
251. See McMillan, supra note 80, at 105 (focusing on the civil nature of the Convention, which makes
enforcement of ajudicial order "lithited to the remedies available under thejurisprudential system of the country
into which the child was abducted").
252. See supra note 247 (contrastingcountriesthatarepartytotheHagueConventionwiththosethatarenot).
253. See Copertino, supra note 58, at 732.
254. See iL (reasoning that "legal systems and divergent social norms of many nations may alienate them
from the Convention").
255. See id.
256. See Bruech, supra note 14, at 106.
257. See Ud at 106-07 (voicing the suspicion that the trend for ill-prepared participation in the Hague
Convention by some countries is "prompted by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child"). Unlike the Hague
Convention, the UN Convention does not require its participants to immediately implement their obligations. See
Id. Accession to the Hague Convention satisfies Article 11 of the UN Convention. See Convention on the Rights
ofthe ChilN4 supra note 33, at. 11 (callingforinternational agreementsto combat child abduction).Therefore, many
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some countries cannot be reached at the telephone numbers provided to the
Permanent Bureau when acceding to the Convention, or that one country answered
the Permanent Bureau with refreshing frankness-a request for a copy of the
Convention.258 Therefore, the drive for an increase in countries participating in the
Hague Convention should be tempered with the requirement that the obligations of
the Treaty be implemented immediately.
2. Noncompliance Among Contracting States
Reasons for noncompliance among Contracting States of the Hague Convention
vary.' Policy reasons and politics may inhibit the enforcement of orders for
return,26 and some signatory countries refuse to extradite their own citizens when
the abductor is a family member rather than a non-related criminal.W 2 In one case
involving a child abducted from the United States to Mauritius, the Mauritian court
refused to return the child because the Treaty was not enacted into the laws of
Maritius, although Mauritius had acceded to the Convention.m Similar cases of
noncompliance are reported involving Austria, Honduras, Mexico, and Sweden.2 4
nations are acceding to the Convention without taking the steps to implement it. See Bruch, supra note 14, at 107.
258. See Bruch, supra note 14, at 107.
259. See IU.
260. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (providing sources that address non.compliance with the
Hague Treaty); McMillan, supra note 80, at 106-07 n.28 (asserting that the goal to return children can be thwarted
by therefusal of "many countries signatory to the Convention... to extradite their own citizens to the United States
based on a reading... [of] treaties, entered into more than 50 years ago, which distinguish family members from
other criminals who will be extradited for kidnaping"); see also id. at 107 (illustrating some countries, such as
Austria and Switzerland, that "demonstrate a complete disregard of the notion of the Convention's reciprocity in
that they repeatedly accept from the United States the return of their children wrongfully removed without
overseeing the return to the United States of those children ordered returned by their own courts").
261. See McMillan, supra note 80, at 106.
262. See I& at 107 n.28 (basing the refusal on the interpretation of an old treaty that differentiates family
members from other criminals in matters of kidnaping).
263. See Pierce, supra note 248 (providing an exemplary case of noncompliance with the Convention);
CongressionalReport on Compliance with theHague Convention, supra note 248 (describing a letter from the U.S.
government requesting that the Central Authority of Mauritius "take all appropriate steps to ensure the proper
operation of the Convention" and the response to that letter explaining that the "State Law Office had originally
briefed the court with inconect information and has made subsequent 'interventions' to advise the court that the
Convention is in force for Mauritius").
264. The United States found Austria to be noncompliant due to confusion on the part of the Austrian
judiciary system about the goals of the Convention. See Congressional Report on Compliance with the Hague
Convention, supra note 248. Honduras, although a party to the Convention since June 1, 1994, never enacted the
provisions of the Convention into Honduran law. See i Mexico has a large numberof cases that remain unresolved
because the Mexican Central Authority is unable to locate many of the children abducted from the United States.
See id. Sweden's noncompliance is based on the failure of its Central Authorities to locate the abducted children,
its legal system's refusal to recognize a U.S. custody order, and its refusal to allow appropriate access to and
visitation of a child by the left-behind parent. See id.
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Any remedy for noncompliance must be handled delicately if comity is to be
fostered among the Contracting States of the Hague Convention.26 The U.S.
Congress ordered that a report on compliance with the Convention be submitted to
its Committee on International Relations,2' 6 and the U.S. State Department invited
"judges and Hague Central Authorities from a number of common law countries to
a conference in Washington this fall to discuss how to improve consistency of
decisions and better implementation of the Convention. 267 More globally, the
Second Special Commission to Study the Operation of the Hague ConventionP
seeks to remedy problems associated with the Convention by involving
representatives of the Contracting States in face-to-face discussions.269
3. The Inconsistencies in the Implementation ofthe ConventionAmong Its
Contracting States
The Hague Convention and perhaps more specifically individual Contracting
States are criticized for the inconsistencies in the implementation of the provisions
of the Hague Convention, particularly with respect to the following: (1) the
standards of proof required to allow the discretionary exceptions, 0 (2) the
designation of who bears the costs of a Hague Convention action,27 and (3) the
interpretations of some of the discretionary exceptions, 272 especially the "grave risk
of harm" exception.t Although a majority may be in agreement that these
inconsistencies create serious problems to the implementation of the Hague
265. See generally State Dep'tReportto Congress, supra note 52 (addressing issues of noncompliance with
respect to applications for the return of children to the United States).
266. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No 105-277, §
2803,112 Stat. 2681, 2681-846 (1998).
267. See Srate Dep't Report to Congress, supra note 52, at 2-3.
268. See PeterH.Pfund,TheDevelopingfurisprudenceoftheRightsofthe Child-ContributionsoftheHague
Conference on Private International Law, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L 665, 668 (noting "sessions of a special
commission" that bring together the officials of Central Authorities of Contracting States to discuss the problems
associated with the Convention and develop solutions while meeting "face to face ... to develop a level of
confidence in each others' motivations to make the Convention work as well as possible in ther respective
countries"). See generally MEEmG REo rTs oNHAGuECoNvENnoNEIcACY, supra note 200 (providing daily
reports of meeting called by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Convention).
269. See supra, note 268 and accompanying text.
270. See Elliott, supra note 249, at21 (observing that "a court should require a high degree of proof before
finding that a grave risk of harm to the child exists").
271. See Silberman, supra note 51, at (3-14 (discussing the costs and expenses involved in a Hague
Convention proceeding and the option allowed each Contracting State under Article 42 of the Convention to make
a reservation to the clause imposing these cost upon the requested Contracting State).
272. See Copertino.supra note 58, at729-31 (characterizing the one-yea statute of limitations of Article 12
of the Hague Convention as it relates to the establishment of a "settled in the new environment' exception as one
of the "weaknesses of the Hague Convention").
273. See supra notes 164-201 and accompanying text (discussing the "grave risk of harm!' exception and
some of its various interpretations when applied to international case law).
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Convention, diverse opinions surface with respect to possible solutions to these
problems.
Clear and convincing evidence must be submitted in a U.S. court before the
consideration of a denial of return of the child based on a "grave risk of harm" or a
"human rights and fundamental freedoms" exceptionY74 Conversely, a lesser burden
of proof, a preponderance of the evidence, is required for the consideration of a
"consent" or"acquiescence" exception, a "child's objection" exception, or a "settled
in the new environment" exceptionY 5 Most Contracting States adhere to a higher
burden of proof for the Article 13(b) and Article 20 exceptions. 276 Although experts
in the field of international child abduction claim the drafters' intended these
exceptions be interpreted narrowly, the provisions themselves do not specify the
burden of proof required for a finding that these exceptions are applicable. 2" The
addition of this specification to Article 13(b) and Article 20 could result in a more
consistently narrow application of the exceptions.
The majority at the Second Special Commission To Study the Operation of the
Hague Convention described the difficulties that evolve from "different cost-bearing
systems in different countries."' 8 The Central Authorities of some Contracting
States bear all the cost of a Convention proceeding, whereas those of others provide
only access to that country's domestic legal aid system.z2 9 Some Contracting States
of the Convention sharply criticize the United States for opting to make a
reservation under Article 42 of the Convention ° and thereby avoiding the costs of
a Hague Convention action that exceed the amount covered by the U.S. legal aid
system. ' Perhaps in response to this criticism, the United States now requires the
abducting parent to pay the costs, including attorney fees, unless "clearly
inappropriate."' 2 Alternatively, one author cautions the parent seeking the return of
the child to expect to pay the cost of return and equates the "willingness to pay"
with "a willingness to provide for the child."283
Although some inconsistencies exist in the outcomes of Hague Convention
proceedings among the various Contracting States with respect to the discretionary
exceptions,2 the most inconsistencies are by far found in the interpretation of the
274. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A) (West 1995).
275. See . § 11603(e)(2)XB).
276. See Hilton, supra note 152.
277. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
278. MummiG REpoRTs oNHAr CoNw.enoNErIcAcY, supra note 200, Part MI (Jan. 18, 1993).
279. See id.
280. Silberman, supra note 51, at 14.
281. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (defining and explaining the "reservation" provision of
Article 42 of the Hague Convention).
282. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11607 (b)(1)-(3) (West 1995).
283. Elliott, supra note 249, at 21.
284. See supra notes 151-320 and accompanying text (discussing each of the five discretionary exceptions
provided by the Hague Convention).
424
The Transnational Lawyer /Vol. 13
"grave risk of harm" exception.w The interpretations of this exception range from
those that conclude that the "grave risk of harm exception" should almost never be
used to protect the best interests of the child 86 to those opinions that view the
exception as an important mechanism to protect the best interests of the child.
Views opposing the use of the "grave risk of harm" exception in all but rare
circumstances insist that the best interests of the child are served by returning the
child to his or her habitual residence and by allowing the tribunals of that country
to determine what is in the best interest of the child. 8
Another exception, the "settled in the new environmenf' exception, is criticized
for its one-year statute of limitations and for the inconsistencies in the interpretation
of "settled."2' 9 Despite the passage of one year since the time of removal or
retention, a number of courts nevertheless order the child returned, finding that the
abductor cannot create his or her own defense by hiding the child for the first year
and then claiming that the child is now settled in the new environment.2c9 Some
courts require that the child to be substantially connected both to the surrounding
community and to the "immediate household of the abducting parent."29' Still other
courts consider the child to be "settled" when the child "has lived almost exclusively
within [the] 'new' family," particularly when the child is very young.9
Several solutions suggested to correct the problems evolving from the one-year
statute of limitations are as follows: (1) the creation of an international
clearinghouse for applications so that such applications are available in any
Contracting State, (2) the requirement that the amount of time needed to locate the
child be tolled until the child is located rather than dismissing the action altogether
when the child cannot be located, (3) the deletion of the one-year time limit all
285. See supra notes 164-201 and accompanying text (analyzing the Article 13(b) "grave risk of harm"
exception).-
286. See Silberman, supra note 51, at 32-33 (declaring that the best interest of children is addressed by the
Convention's purpose-by the prevention of abductions and the prompt return of children to their habitual
residence).
287. See Starr, supra note 1, at 829 (declaring the exceptions provided by the Hague Convention are its
"major impact towards the child's interests!).
288. See A v A (1996) (.Z), available in william M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited Sept. 24, 2000)
<http//www.hiltonhouse.com/cses/Ava-nz.txt> (copy on filewith The TransnationalLawyer);see also Gunsburg,
supra note 11.
289. See Copertino, supra note 58, at 729-30.
290. See DeArrendondo v. Salto (1997) (CaL), available in William M. Hilton, Hilton House (visited Sept.
24, 2000) <http.//www.hiltonhouse. com!caseslMartinezcalifornia.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (reporting a case where the court tolled the timelimitation of oneyear forbringingaction and subsequently
ordered the return of the children to Mexico from California); see also Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927,946 (11th Cir.
1998) (detailing a case in which the petitioner, with the assistance of state, national, and international agencies,
searched for two years forher children who were abductedby their father from Germany to the United States). The
court ordered the return of the children on the grounds that the children werenot yet"well-settled," and notedthat
the one-year time limit may be equitably tolled when the wrongdoer conceals the whereabouts of the children. See
291. See ,mE G REPORTS ON HAGUE CoNVENTION EFFICACY, supra note 200.
292. Id
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together, and (4) the tolling of the statue of limitations until after the child is
located.?3 The suggestion that an international clearinghouse be created solves other
problems associated with the Hague Convention.294 A clearinghouse would allow
the maintenance of more accurate, centralized records of abducted children, which
in turn would enable further study of the problems associated with the
Convention? 5 Unfortunately, this solution also creates an additional problem-the
funding of such an endeavor.2
Few solutions are available to address the problems associated with the
inconsistencies in outcomes, perhaps due to the discretionary nature of the
exceptions.297 Nonetheless, the unpredictability of discretionary judicial decisions,
created by the tension between traditionally narrow interpretations of the law and
the expansion of the law to cover newly identified circumstance, "humanizefs] the
law even as [it] distorts" the laws 8 The question is whether humanization is a
healthy evolution of the law. Generally, experts agree that the education of the
lawyers and the judiciary systems of each Contracting State would help to
ameliorate the problem of inconsistency in the outcomes of Hague Convention
actions. Few agree, however, on a single, feasible method to accomplish that
education.2
4. The Narrow Focus of the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention, with its few exceptions, is criticized as being too
narrow and inflexible because it predominately addresses only the jurisdictional
293. See Copertino. supra note 58, at 731 (delineating possible solutions for the potential for unfairnes'that
may arise when the statute of limitation runs while the child is being hidden by the abducting parent).
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. SeeMEmNoREPoERsONHAGUECONVMONEACAY,supranote2OO(elaboraingon"teinancial
limit for Pernnent Bureau's activities of collecting and distributing information," a limit that "was reached quite
some time ago").
297. See generally Robert L Levy, Memoir of an Academic Lawyer Hague Convention Theory tConfronts
Practice, 29 FAM.L.Q. 171, 185-86 (1995) (suggesting that whether interpreted strictly or broadly and regardless
of whichjurisdiction makes the decisions regarding custody, all are subject to "the good sense and moderation of
judges").
298. L at 186 (discussing the tensions between academic or legislative reform and the goals and
responsibilities of practicing lawyers, implying that such a tension is healthy).
299. Some courts advocate the direct communication betweenjudges ofthe two Contracting States involved.
See MandJ, supra note 162,1033, 034, 036, 046,049 (describing the advantages ofjudicial collaboration in one
case involving England and the United States). The Permanent Bureau of Hague Convention proposed that
cooperation and consistency in outcomes of Hague Convention proceedings can be improved by the enhanced
awareness ofjudges and lawyers of Contracting States of "the particularities of the Convention." See MEE NO
REPoRTs ON HAGUE CONVENTON EFICACY, supra note 200. Recently, a delegation of judges representing six
Contracting States met to discuss the best way to deal with Hague Convention cases and pledged to "endeavor to
inform their colleagues in their respective jurisdictions" about their findings regarding the practical operation of
Hague Convention proceedings. International Child Custody; A Common Law Judicial Conference on September
21, 2000,BestPractices(1)(c) (visitedNov. 3,2000) <http'/lwww.hiltonhouse.colarticles/Best-Practies.txt. (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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aspect of international child abduction." Some commentators object to the fact that
the Convention only addresses "the narrow aspect of the quarrel between the
parents" in determining the appropriate jurisdiction and does not "act on behalf of
a child" or "address the civil and human rights of a child." '' The more recent
interest of the international community in children's rights supports this criticism.2
A current international treaty addressing jurisdiction states that "the best interests
of the child are to be a primary consideration" in all international disputes involving
children.m Despite the Hague Convention's proclamation that "children are of
paramount importance in matters relating to their custody,'a3 4 the Treaty has been
found to be "retrograde" or outdated in its failure to "act on behalf of a child." s
The commentators who caution against "well-intentioned child savers" that
"frustrate the objectives of the Convention" oppose this criticism. ° They are
concerned that "under the guise of best interests," the commonplace use of
exceptions such as the "grave risk of harm" exception will convert the procedural
nature of the Hague Convention into one of substance.3 7 In other words, these
commentators are worried that use of a best interests of the child standard will
convert the Hague Convention into a treaty used to determine the custody of the
child and perhaps promote forum shopping as a means of procuring a favorable
custody decision. According to this view, the best interest of the child is served
when custody decisions are made within the jurisdiction of the child's habitual
residence.m Absent from both of these views is the assurance that the child's
interests are best served by either returning or denying the return of the child to his
or her habitual residence.
5. Inability To Enforce Civil Decisions Based on the Hague Convention
in Another Contracting State
The Hague Convention is criticized for its inability to enforce the decision of a
requested Contracting State, particularly if the decision involves conditions to be
300. See Starr, supra note 1, at 830.
301. Id.
302. See id; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 33. But see Murray, supra note 188
(finding that the Hague Convention does not conflict with the United Nations Convention because the Hague
Convention considers that "the rights of the child are best protected by having issues as to custody and access
determined by the Courts of the country of the child's habitual residence.").
303. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the Eighteenth Session with the
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-Operation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection ofChildren, and Decisions on Matters Pertaining to the Agenda of
the Conference, Oct. 19,1996,35 I..M. 1391, 1396.
304. Hague Convention, supra note 4, preamble.
305. Starr, supra note 1, at 830.
306. See Silbernan, supra note 51, at 32-33.
307. See it. at 33.
308. See id.
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observed in the habitual residence once the child is returned. One mechanism
courts employ to satisfy the required return under the Hague Convention and yet
consider the best interest of the child is to order specific conditions or
"undertakings. 310 Commentators supporting the view that "undertakings" ought to
accompany the return of the child to the habitual residence base the success of the
Convention upon the "fair-minded[ness] and impartial decision making" of the
authorities in the state of the child's habitual residence.3 11 The Convention is further
criticized for a lack of systematic follow-up regarding the status of the child after the
return3 12 Unfortunately, the Second Special Commission To Study the Operation
of the Hague Convention vetoed a proposal requiring follow-up by the Central
Authority of the requesting state in situations where the child is returned to "the
conflict situation which led to the abduction. 31' Experts attending the Commission
agreed that "the duties of the Central Authorities are terminated once the child is
returned" and dealing with any problems is "within the exclusive competence of the
State of habitual residence.' 31
4
In addition, whether an order to return the child is enforced by the country into
which the child was abducted depends entirely upon the judicial system of that
country 15 In the United States, the courts have the contempt powers for violations
of return orders3 6 Moreover, in the United States, under the International Parental
Kidnaping Act, the issuance of a warrant for arrest of the abducting parent allows
the Department of Justice and Interpol to become involved in efforts to return the
child? 17 Other Contracting States that do not have similar mechanisms for enforcing
the orders of its tribunals and whose court orders are not followed are characterized
as noncompliant with the provisions of the Hague Convention s Thus, although the
drafters of the Hague Convention sought to create uniformity in dealing with
international child abduction, many individual Contracting States are not equipped
309. See McMillan, supra note 80, at 105 (explaining the problems with enforcing orders of one Contracting
State in another Contracting State).
310. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text; see also Hilton, supra note 152 (defining an
"undertaking" as "an agreement/stipulation between the parties on the specific issue of the logistics ofreturning a
child to his or her 'habitual residence ').
311. See Silberman, supra note 51, at 34.
312. See id.
313. See ME t O RE ORE s ONHARGUECONVIMONEPPICACY, supra note 200.
314. Id.
315. See McMillan, supranote 80, at 105.
316. See id
317. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (West 1997) (declaring international child abduction to be a federal crime).
Interpol is the International Criminal Police Organization, a coordinating group for international law enforcement.
BLACK'S LAwDICTIONARY 821 (7th ed. 1999).
318. See supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
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to uniformly enforce the Treaty.3 19 The lack of uniformity among the various
tribunals of Contracting States is demonstrated in international case law."2
IV. SELECT INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASE LAW INVOLVING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND/OR CHILI ABUSE
Real cases of domestic violence and child abuse are surfacing in international
child abduction cases3 21 Most parents that abduct their children to escape the
violence ultimately defend the abduction and under that Article 13(b) "grave risk of
harm" exception.3 2 Even though the courts of almost all Contracting States adhere
to a narrow interpretation of the "grave risk of harm" exception, the outcomes vary
and involve the discretion of the presiding court? 23 Although individual tribunals are
"not bound by the decisions of courts of other states or by the manner in which a
treaty has been interpreted in other nations[,]"324 reciprocity and "respectful
attentione' 325 to the views of the various tribunals of Contracting States are important
to the success of the Hague Convention in deterring international child abduction.?2
The following select cases are reviewed, keeping in mind the tension created
between the duty of courts to act according to their independent discretion and the
primary goal of comity set forth by the Hague Convention.m
319. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 270-99 (criticizing the inconsistencies in the implementation of the Convention among
Contracting States).
321. See Infra notes 345-60 and accompanying text (detailing an Australia-New Zealand case involving
allegations of severe domestic violence); see also infra notes 375.413 and accompanying text (describing a
Venezuela-United States case involving both domestic violence and child abuse); see also infra notes 414-483
(reporting the Blondin case, including the initial District Court decision, the Second Circuit review of first
impression, and the decision ofthe District Court an remand); see also infr notes 484-516 and accompanying text
(adopting the Blondin approach to international child abduction in a case that presented clear and convincing
evidence of child abuse).
322. Compare Grilli, supra note6, at79(reportingin 1997 thatfew caseshaveanalyzed situations involving
domestic violence), with Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999) (involving domestic violence and child
abuse), Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955 (Conn. 2000) (analyzing a case of domestic violence and child sexual
abuse), and Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d 456,462 (D. Md. 1999) (applying the "grave risk of harm"
exception to a case of domestic violence and child abuse).
323. See supra notes 165-201 and accompanying text (discussing the "grave risk of harm" exception).
324. Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 489 (NJ. 1992), citing Ex Parte Charton, 185 F. 880, 886 (D.NJ.
1911) (maintaining that courts have "the duty of acting independently... to accept full responsibility in
determining the construction that is to be given to the treaties[,]" and declaring that"the construction placed upon
some of [a treaty's] provisions by the departments of the foreigncountry with whom theTreatyis made, executive,
legislative, orjudicial, is not controlling!).
325. Tahan, 613 A.2d at 489 (calling for a uniform approach in addressing the Hague Convention with
"respectful attention" of the views of other courts).
326. See supra note 80-82 and accompanying text.
327. Compare Perez Report, supra note 11, 37, with Ex Parte Charlton, 185 F. at 886 (declaring a cour's
duty to act independently).
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A. Wright v. Gueriel (1993 France)
On January 22,1993, Ms. Gueriel brought her three children to France from the
United States.32 Mr. Wright, Ms. Gueriel's husband and father of the children,
brought a Hague Convention action on August 6, 1993, seeking return of the
children to the United States.329 Ms. Gueriel raised a "grave risk of harm" defense,
based on her husband's alleged violent and aggressive behavior.30 To prove these
allegations, Ms. Gueriel offered the testimony of three witnesses. 31 First, Mr.
Mulhem, a U.S. postal service officer and work colleague of Ms. Gueriel during
four years of her marriage to Mr. Wright, testified that Mr. Wright experienced
severe depression, was out of work for a year, and forced his wife to work overtime
to support the family.332 More significantly, he testified that on two occasions, Mr.
Wright pushed his wife, that he saw the marks from the blows, and that he
accompanied Ms. Gueriel to the police station to report the incident, but Mr. Wright
destroyed receipt of that report.3 33 Mr. Mulhem also reported that Ms. Gueriel
confided in him that she was afraid to ask for a divorce in the United States because
she feared for her life .34
Second, Mrs. Lormier, aFrench citizen who lived with the Wright couple during
eight months of their marriage, testified that Mr. Wright had an aggressive and
violent personality and that he was extremely possessive of Ms. Gueriel, whom he
did not permit to go out except to go to work. 35 She further reported that Mr. Wright
degraded Ms. Gueriel in front of their children and that the "shouting and
arguments" disturbed the children. 36
Finally, Erik Gueriel, Ms. Gueriel's brother, testified that on two different visits
to his sister's home he observed Mr. Wright both physically and verbally violent
toward his three children.3 37 He also testified to the possessive nature of Mr. Wright
and characterized his sister as being "effectively imprisoned" by her husband.3
Perhaps most persuasive to the court, Mr. Gueriel told the court that he heard Mr.
Wright threaten to "destroy" the three children if Ms. Gueriel did not return
immediately from a two week visit with her family in France.339
328. See Wright, supra note 25, at 3. Alain Cornec. a French attorney assisting the legal firm that represented
Mr. Wight, contributed this case to Mr. Hilton's website.
329. See i.
330. See id.
331. Seek!.
332. See id.
333. See kU
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. Id.
337. See id.
338. See i.
339. See id.
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To support his position, Mr. Wright introduced statements from neighbors,
clergy, and the family doctor that described Mr. Wright as "an affectionate, attentive
father who spent a great deal of time with his children."1' 4 Moreover, in a separate
interview, the two oldest children corroborated this characterization by describing
their father as "'gentil' (kind)."3" For reasons not clearly presented in the report of
this case, the French court found the evidence produced by Ms. Gueriel to be more
probative.34 In the opinion of the court, the situation for the children appeared to be
one in which "the children became hostages in the 'death crisis' of the couple," and
"the risk, albeit statistically minimal" is that Mr. Wright, "overwhelmed by a
sudden and destructive suicidal impulse, would at any particular time, put his threats
into effect." 343 The court determined this risk to be an Article 13(b) "grave risk of
harm" and consequently denied the return of the children to the United States.3"
B. Murray (1993 Australia)
In theMurray case,45 the mother abducted her three children fromNew Zealand
to Australia, where she immediately petitioned the Australian court for custody of
the children, personal protection, and arestraining order against her husband.3 Two
months later, but before the Australian custody hearing, the father applied under the
Hague Convention for the return of his children? 47 Admonishing the wife's
attorneys for failure to inform the Australian court of the father's Hague Convention
action, the court found the removal of the children from New Zealand to be
wrongful " and vacated the earlier Australian custody ruling that granted custody
to the mother?4'
In her defense, the mother asserted a "grave risk of harm" exception, claiming
that her husband inflicted "numerous acts of violence" and "made death threats to
her."'3' O In her affidavit, the mother stated that her husband made "violent attacks
over some days in April 1993, which included head butting, punching, kneeing her
at the base of the spine and death threats."351 To corroborate her affidavit, she
presented photographs which were taken the day before leaving New Zealand and
340. IeL at 4.
341. Id. The youngest child was not old enough to express himself, See id.
342. See id.
343. Id.
344. See id.
345. Murray, supra note 188.
346. See U at 1.
347. See a
348. See Ed.
349. See id. at 10, 13-14 (discussing how allowing an abducting parent to seek a custody order in another
country, that wouldbe honored in the country ofhabitual residence, wouldundermnine theverypurpose of the Hague
Convention).
350. Id at 1.
351. Id. at4.
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which showed "considerable physical damage and bruising to her."32 She also
claimed that her husband was a member of the gang, "Mongrel Mob," and that her
husband was likely to influence other gang members to act with violence against her
if she stayed in New Zealand. 53 She reported that her husband kept an assortment
of weapons "including un-licensed firearms, 'Nunchukas,' knives, chains and meat
cleavers in his home. '3 ' She told the court that she left New Zealand, not to gain an
advantage in custody proceedings, but to remove herself and her children from "a
situation of violence, fear, and terror."355 She claimed to have no safe place with
friends or relatives in New Zealand, but she said that she had her father and other
family members in Australia on whom she could call for help.
356
The Australian court found "no evidence to suggest that the children would
come to any harm if they were to be returned and that the New Zealand Courts ...
would act swiftly to protect the wife should the need arise."3-5 Furthermore, the
court found that to conclude that the wife and children could not be protected by the
courts of New Zealand would be "presumptuous and offensive in the extreme."
358
The court suggested that the mother did not have to return to the same location as
the father.359 The court held that because the children were New Zealand citizens,
"their future!' should be determined under the jurisdiction of the courts of New
Zealand.6 0
C. Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley (1994 United States)
Enrique Nunez-Escuder married Stephanie Tice-Menley in Mexico, and one
year later they had a son.3 6' When the child was two months old, Ms. Tice-Menley
abducted the child from Mexico and returned to her parents' home in Minnesota. 62
Mr. Nunez-Escuder filed an action for wrongful removal under the Hague
Convention.3  The district court denied the claim based on the "grave risk of harm"
exception, but without determining that Mexico was the child's habitual
residence.3 Mr. Nunez-Escuder appealed.6 s
352. Id.
353. See id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Seek!.
357. Id at7 (emphasis added).
358. Id. at 19.
359. See iU
360. See !& at 20.
361. See Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374,375 (8th Cir. 1994).
362. See i!.
363. See U!
364. See U at 374.
365. See id at 375.
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Ms. Tice-Menley claimed that "an infant's habitual residence follows that of his
mother" and that Mexico was her "coerced residence."366 Supported by her own
affidavit and the affidavits of her parents and a psychologist, Ms. Tice-Menley
suggested that "the baby could be subject to a grave risk of physical or
psychological harm or be placed in an intolerable situation in Mexico." 67 She
claimed that she was "physically, sexually, and verbally abused by her husband."3'a
Her husband and father-in-law did not permit her to leave the family home.36 She
feared for her baby's safety and reported that the family criticized her breast-feeding
the baby and refused to obtain a baby safety seat for the car. She told of her father-
in-law's verbal abuse and of having "seen [him] hit his youngest son with a wooden
plunger."37
0
The court found Ms. Tice-Menley's evidence to be insufficient to satisfy a
"grave risk of harm" exception 71 The court suggested that it would consider the
social background of the child and the evaluation of the people and circumstances
awaiting the child upon return, and further stated that psychological evaluations are
not be "per se irrelevant. '3 72 However, in remanding the case, the court instructed
that in order to find a grave risk of harm or harm that would otherwise place the
child in an intolerable situation, Ms. Tice-Menley must present clear and convincing
evidence that such harm exists in Mexico.7 3 The court also instructed the lower
court to determine the habitual residence of the child.374
D. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez (1999 United States)
On May 29, 1998, Mrs. Rodriguez left the childhood home of her father in
Venezuela, where she lived with her husband and three children, and took her three
children with her 75 She moved the children to the United States to live with her
mother in Maryland? 76 Seven months later, Mr. Rodriguez filed an action under the
Hague Convention for the return of his children.77 Mrs. Rodriguez argued that
return of her children to Venezuela would expose them to a "grave risk of physical
366. Id. at379.
367. Id. at 376 (eniphasis added).
368. Id.
369. See id
370. Id
371. See Id.
372. See id. at 377-78.
373. See Id at 378.
374. See Id.
375. See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d 456,457 (D. Md. 1999).
376. See Id
377. See id. at 458. A Warrant in Lieu of Wrt of Habeas Corpus is a warrant used by authorities to "bring
a person before a court ... to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW
DIcTioNARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).
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or psychological harm or otherwise place the children in an intolerable situation."3
To support her argument, Mrs. Rodriguez offered the testimony of herself;379 her
oldest son, Jorge;380 her oldest daughter, Alejandra; her sister and mother;381 and her
psychiatrist, Dr. Killene.382
The court interviewed Jorge, age thirteen, outside of the presence of both
parents 83 Tragically, he testified that his father "first began to hit him when he was
six years old."384 He described one incident when he was beat with a one inch belt
about his legs, back, and buttocks, causing welts and bruises, and forcing him to
miss one week of school.3 The beating occurred because he "had been told three
times to leave a friend's house where he was playing.': 38 Another time, when Jorge
was in third grade and lost a watch his father had given him for graduation, his
father "kicked him at least twice in the back and hit him with his fists" while at
school.3 His father told him that he must not tell anyone if he sustained bruises.388
He testified that his father physically assaulted him about twice a month and
"demeaned him and called him by 'bad wdrds' daily? 89
Jorge also described frequent episodes when his father hit and choked his
mother, and one episode when his father "pushed [his mother] down the stairs when
she was pregnant." a3 He talked about his fear of and the unpredictability of his
father's temper? 91 The court found Jorge to be "uniquely mature and articulate,"
with his judgment unaffected by his lifestyle in the United States.92 He did not seem
to have been coached and stated, "He is my father, I have to love him, but he does
bad things" 3 93
Mrs. Rodriguez's testimony was consistent with that of Jorge. She described
Jorge's condition after his first beating as "naked, with blows all over his body from
his head to his toes."394 She reported her husband's abuse to the police, but she
dropped the complaint after he "promised it would never happen again. She also
told about how a teacher observed the beating that occurred over the watch and
378. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 459; see also Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13(b).
379. See id. at 460.
380. See id. at 459-60.
381. See Ud at 460-61.
382. See id. at461.
383. See id at 458.
384. Id. at 459.
385. See id.
386. lit
387; Id. at459-60.
388. SeeiL at 460.
389. d.
390. d.
391. Seeid.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
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about how the school psychologist requested to speak with her husband about the
abuse of Jorge?96 She described how her husband and her father kept loaded guns
in the house and how they fired them in the house when they were drinking.397
Alejandra, the middle child, said that her father never hit her, but she was afraid
of misbehaving" 8 She also corroborated the abuse of Jorge and her mother?"
Mrs. Rodriguez's mother and sister recounted that following a particular incident of
abuse, they accompanied Mrs. Rodriguez to several different police stations, and
that each station refused to become involved in a domestic dispute.40D The sister
stated that Mr. Rodriguez called her after her sister abducted the children and told
her, "I will find you and I will kill you-don't forget you have a daughter." ' °
Dr. Killene testified that Mrs. Rodriguez, Jorge, and Alejandra suffer from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of Mr. Rodriguez's abuse. ' According to
Dr. Killene, even though Alejandra was not directly physically abused, witnessing
abuse can be more traumatic than actual physical abuse.4 Both the children have
nightmares attributed to the stress, and Dr. Killene's "only hope of recovery" for the
children was that they remain in "a safe and secure enviromnent.:"
Mr. Rodriguez did not present his own expert witness!O In fact, the court found
his testimony to be the most persuasive in its determination that the children should
not be returned to Venezuela.4 The court found him "evasive," "argumentative,"
and "self-contradictory."4° He firmly denied ever hitting or using "corporal
punishment on Jorge.'" 3 He expressed contempt for the profession of psychology
and denied any fault in his family's crisis. Not unsurprisingly, the court found his
testimony to lack credibility and to demonstrate an unlikelihood that Mr. Rodriguez
would change his behavior'1 The court also suggested that the risk to
Mrs. Rodriguez and her children "increased exponentially as a result of these
proceedings.""1 The court found this case to closely match the type of situation that
is "clearly within the grave risk" exception and denied the father's petition for the
396. See id at 461 n.5 (noting two documents from Venezuela, (1) a report from the psychologist at jorge's
school detailing the watch incident and (2) a statement from a neighbor describing observations of Jorge's abuse,
but declining to give either documents weight because of evidentiary concerns).
397. See id.
398. See Id.
399. See .
400. See l at 460-61.
401. 14 at461.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. Id.
405. See Ed.
406. See iU)
407. d.
408. See d.
409. See id.
410. See id.
411. rL
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return of the children.4t2 This case was later criticized for not"exploring the prospect
of arranging an alternative placement for the [children], or the home jurisdiction's
capacity to enforce such an arrangement. 413
E. Blondin v. Dubois (2000 United States)
Mr. Blondin and Ms. Dubois, both French citizens, never married, but they had
two children together and lived together, off and on, for approximately seven
years.41 4 Ms. Dubois also had a son Crispin by a prior relationship, who was sixteen
years old when Mr. Blondin's first child, Marie-Eline, was born.4'5 Within the first
year of the relationship, Mr. Blondin began to beat Ms. Dubois, even as she held
their child.4! 16 In camera, Marie-Eline corroborated that her father hit her and her
mother with a belt, and "he spit on my mommy too. 417 In 1992, Mr. Blondin
choked Marie-Eline, then one year old, by wrapping a piece of electrical cord
around her neck and threatened to kill both the child and her mother.418 The
following day, Ms. Dubois took her daughter and older son to a shelter for battered
women, but after two weeks, Mr. Blondin came and took them home with him.419
In 1993, Ms. Dubois again sought escape from her husband in a women's shelter
and eventually moved to another shelter, where she and her two children stayed for
eight to nine months.4 20 During that year, Mr. Blondin petitioned the French courts
for custody of Marie-Eline; however, the couple reconciled and Ms. Dubois became
pregnant with Mr. Blondin's second child, Francois.4 2' According to Ms. Dubois'
affidavit, the beatings and threats continued even during the pregnancy.4
In March of 1995, a doctor reported that Ms. Dubois had headaches and a
localized swelling of the lower jaw, and complained that her husband hit her.4u1 In
June 1995, another doctor found an injury under her right eye and hematomas on her
left arm and both breasts caused by her husband. 24 In August 1995, Francois was
born.!2 After Francois' birth, the beatings continued with Mr. Blondin often
412. See U at 462.
413. Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955,973 n.16 (Conn. 1999).
414. See Blondin v. Dubois, 19 F. Supp. 2d 123. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Blondin 1].
415. See id.
416. See id.
417. Id.
418. See id
419. See Ud
420. See id at 125. Ms. Dubols' older son, Crispin, had to stay in a different shelter for young adults
"[b]ecause of his age." Id.
421. See iL
422. See Ui
423. See id.
424. See id.; see also Blondin v. Dubois, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283,286 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter Blondin
MI] (reporting this same case on remand from the Second Circuit and its finding that Mr. Blondin abused Ms.
Dubois not only upon the testimonies of Ms. Dubois and Marie-Eline, but also upon medical records).
425. See Blondin , 19 F. Supp. 2d at 125.
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threatening to "kill everyone" and threatening "to throw Francois out the
window."42 6 In August 1997, Ms. Dubois abducted the children and went to the
United States to live with her brother and other family members.!
7
Mr. Blondin then petitioned the District Court for the return of his children to
France under the Hague Convention.4 Ms. Dubois, represented by counsel
appointed by the court through the Legal Aid Society,42 defended her abduction of
the children under the Article 13(b) exception of the Hague Convention 3 The issue
before the trial court in Blondin v. Dubois431 was whether the return of Marie-Eline
and Francois to France would place them at "grave risk of harm" in accordance with
Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention 32 Based on the testimonies of Ms. Dubois,
Mr. Blondin, and Marie-Eline, who was interviewed outside the presence of her
parents and their attorneys, the court concluded that the evidence presented
established by clear and convincing proof that the return of the children to France
would present a "grave risk of harm" to the children and dismissed Mr. Blondin's
petition for return4
33
The court based its conclusion largely on the repetitive nature of Mr. Blondin's
abuse of his children and Ms. Dubois and noted that "[tihe situation deteriorated to
the point again in 1997 when Ms. Dubois felt she had no choice but to leave France
altogether.4'4 Moreover, the court was "firmly convinced that [Blondin] was not
telling the truth."435 Particularly unconvincing was Mr. Blondin's testimony thatMs.
Dubois claimed to be a battered spouse in 1993 in order to live in a center for
battered women.!4 Mr. Blondin's testimony regarding whether or not he ever hit his
children or Ms. Dubois was also inconsistent and self-contradicting 37 Finally, he
gave misleading facts regarding the 1993 French court's custody order.438
The court considered the current situation of the children in the United States
and the fact that Ms. Dubois and the children were now being supported by family
and found that returning the children to France with Ms. Dubois without financial
resources of their own would be "extremely disruptive" 439 The court rejected the
426. l1&
427. See id.
428. See i& at 124. Mr. Blondin's petition in the United States was brought under section 2(b)(4) of the
InternationalChild Abduction Re ediesAct. See42U.S.C.A. §11601(b)(4) (codifyingoftheHague Convention).
429. See W3londin 1, 19 F. Supp. 2d. at 126.
430. See U at 126.
431. See ih at 124.
432. See id. at 127.
433. See I. at 127, 129.
434. Id. at 127-28.
435. Id4 at 128. The court characterized Mr. Blondin's testimony as "incredible:' See i
436. See id.
437. See!& aMBlondin's testimony regardingabusevaillatedbetweentotal denialto"veryrarely" spanking
and maintained that he never hit Ms. Dubois "in the presence of the children:' See id
438. See id Mr. Blondin implied that the French court hadgiven the couple joint custody despite the protest
of Ms. Dubois when in fact she had told the French court that "she wanted to live with Blondin again."See I d
439. See Id
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idea of Ms. Dubois and the children being financially dependent on Mr. Blondin,
finding the possibility of Mr. Blondin supporting their separate housing to be
infeasible because of Mr. Blondin's testimony thathe could not even afford the price
of an airline ticket to return to the United States.40 Finally, the court found Marie-
Eline's objection to returning to France, while not dispositive, was a supporting
factor in its decision to deny Mr. Blondin's petition."'
Mr. Blondin appealed the District Court's decision and presented the Second
Circuit with "issues of first impression regarding the application of the Hague
Convention."' 7Z The Second Circuit did not disturb the District Court's conclusion
that the evidence was clear and convincing that the children had been physically
abused and would be placed at risk of physical abuse if returned to Mr. Blondin's
custody" 3 Nevertheless, the court vacated the denial of Mr. Blondin's petition for
return and remanded the case back to the District Court for further consideration of
the range of remedies that might allow both return of the children to their home
country and their protection from harm, pending a custody award by a French court
with proper jurisdiction.4"
On remand and in light of the Second Circuit's "clarified standard, ' " s the
District Court created a thorough record depicting the facts that led the court to
determine that Marie-Eline and Francois would be at "grave risk of harm" not only
if they were to be returned to Mr. Blondin, but also if they returned to France.: 6
Judge Chin solicited and received responses from the French Central Authority,
other French officials, and the U.S. Department of State." 7 In addition, the court
heard the testimonies of a French lawyer specializing in family and international
law, an expert in child psychiatry and psychology, Ms. Dubois, Marie-Eline, and
Francois! 48
While maintaining the children wouldnot be returned to the custody of Mr.
Blondin, the court explored the possibility of "an undertaking," which would allow
Ms. Dubois to return with the children to France for a custody hearing. 9 Based on
440. See id
441. See id
442. Blondin v. Dubois, 189 FMd 240,241 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Blondin nI].
443. See id at 242.
444. See id at 250.
445. Id. at 242 (providing the "clarified standarc' that "the Hague Convention requires a more complete
analysis of the full panoply of arrangements that might allow the children to be returncd to the country from which
they were(concededly) wrongfully abducted,in order to allow the courts of that nation an opportunity to adjudicate
custody"). The court further directed future courts considering Hague Convention cases "to make every effort" to
simultaneously honor the Convention's purposes (1) to return wrongfully abducted children to their habitual
residence for custody decisions by the courts of that country and (2) to protect the children from "grave risk of
harm." See id
446. See Blondin m, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283,284 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (presenting the District Court's decision on
remand from the Second Circuit).
447. See id
448. See id. at 285.
449. See id
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the testimony of the government's expert witness, Veronique Chauveau, the court
determined what specific social services and legal protections were likely to be
available forMs. Dubois and the children.45 Although Ms. Dubois had a court order
pending in France giving joint custody to Mr. Blondin and Ms. Dubois, Ms. Dubois
could seek a modification of that order to give her temporary custody pending the
outcome of a new custody hearing.451 At the same time, the French court could
appoint a child psychiatrist and social worker to evaluate Ms. Dubois and the
children.4 52 The expert estimated that the process of obtaining a French custody
decision could take from one to three months, depending on the efforts of Ms.
Dubois's attorney, the social workers involved, and the "willingness" of the parties
to cooperate.4 3
Through his attorney, Mr. Blondin offered the "undertaking ' 54 or stipulation
that he would pay for the airfare to France for Ms. Dubois and the children, and for
a three week stay in a "one-star hotel," so that Ms. Dubois would have shelter while
she applied for government assistance.4 55 The French expert testified that the French
courts would probably enforce the undertakings that Mr. Blondin offered so long as
they do not conflict with the public policy of France.456 Ms. Dubois could
immediately receive free legal assistance if authorized by the presiding judge.4 ' She
would be eligible for a minimal support allotment each month, depending on how
much Mr. Blondin contributed for their support, or "she could apply for residence
in a shelter."45
8
The Office of the Public Prosecutor provided a statement declaring that Ms.
Dubois would not be prosecuted for the abduction of the children or the forgery of
Mr. Blondin's signature on the children's passports if she returned to France4 5 9
Conversely, in a letter to the U.S. Department of State, the French Ministry of
Justice, the Central Authority of France, threatened to extradite Ms. Dubois from the
United States for criminal prosecution of abduction and forgery if she did not
willingly return to France with the children.4o
The District Court also considered the findings from a repeat interview with the
children, along with the findings of Dr. Albert Solnit, Sterling Professor Emeritus
of Pediatrics and Psychiatry at Yale University Child Study Center, who examined
450. See id. at 288.
451. See id.
452. See id.
453. Id.
454. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing "undertakings").
455. See Blondin 11, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283,289 (SD.N.Y. 2000).
456. See Ud The case does not expound on French public policy in these kinds of situations.
457. See Ud
458. See id.
459. See id.
460. See !d at 289-90.
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both Marie-Eline and Francois.45' In Dr. Solnit's opinion, the children suffered from
a trauimatic stress disorder from which they were now recovering due to the "secure
environment of their home and extended family" in the United States. The doctor
further opined that a return to France would create a "traumatizing uncertainty" in
the minds of the children regarding their future, to the risking reversal of any
recovery that they have so far achieved in their present safe environment. 4  He
further concluded that placement of the children with a third party, even without any
contact from Mr. Blondin, would return them to the conditions of their primary
trauma, and that any return to France would "almost certainly" trigger recurrence
of the stress disorder and result in "long-term or even permanent har" to their
development. 4' Finally, the judge considered Marie-Eline's objection to returning
to France, particularly the her statement that she "never want(s] to go back to [her]
daddy," even for a visit, or to visit Paris for more than one day.
The court concluded that the return of the children to France, under any
arrangement, would expose the children to a "grave risk" of "physical or
psychological harm."''4 The reasons for this conclusion are as follows: (1) removing
the children from their present secure environment would set back the recovery the
children have achieved, (2) returning to France, the site of their past trauma, and
having to endure the uncertainties and pressures of custody proceedings, would
cause the children further psychological hann,4 and (3) recognition that Marie-
Eline objected to being returned to France.!"
Finally, the court addressed the following three arguments raised by Mr.
Blondin, France, and the United States: (1) removal of the children from their home
creates a common adjustment problem that other courts declined to find consistent
with the Article 13(b) exception,4 0 (2) this court is reading the Article 13(b)
exception too broadly because, for the "grave risk of harm" exception to be
applicable, the court must find that France is incapable or unwilling to give the
children adequate protection,'71 and (3) this court is interfering with a pending
461. See id. at 288. Judge Chin spoke with the children, again outside the presence of their mother and the
attorneys and without wearing his robe to put the children at ease. See ia! at 293 n.10.
462. See id. at 291.
463. See id.
464. See id. at 292.
465. Id.
466. See id. at 294.
467. See iU! at 295 (expounding on the repercussions of the removal of the children from their present
environment and giving "great weight" to Dr. Solnit's opinion and citing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d
456 (D.Md. 1999), in support).
468. See id, at 295-96 (noting as factors the uncertainty and insecurity of temporary living arrangements in
France the effect the one to three months anticipated for the custody proceedings would have on the children, and
the inability of this court to guarantee that Mr. Blondin would not gain custody of the children).
469. See id. at 296 (stressingthatMarie-Eline's objection to being returned to France is not dispositive, but
rather a factor to be taken into account by the court in its decision).
470. See U at 297.
471. See i. at 297-98.
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French custody decision and "unduly asserting jurisdiction over a French custody
dispute."' 72
In addressing the first argument, the District Court emphasized the abuse
inflicted upon Ms. Dubois and the children 73 The court relied upon the facts
supporting the abuse to distinguish this case from others where the harm alleged was
nothing more than the disruption of relocation474 or the separation from a long-time
caretaker.475
Regarding the second argument, the court chose to follow the regulations of the
U.S. State Department, 476 which do not condition a finding of "grave risk of harm"
on a finding that the court of the child's habitual residence is incapable or unwilling
to protect the child. n Judge Chin stressed confidence in France's ability to protect
the children from further abuse, but expressed disbelief that France could protect
them from the trauma of being uprooted from a place where they feel safe and
secure and returned to a place where they were seriously abused4 7
The court confronted the third argument with a direct approach 47 Judge Chin
claimed authority under the Hague Convention to apply the Article 13(b) exception,
but distinguished his decision from one made on the "ultimate merits of the custody
dispute" to one made on the "merits of the abduction claim under the
Convention.""' The judge expressed concern over the "veiled threats" of the French
Ministry of Justice to extradite Ms. Dubois and prosecute her for the abduction of
the children if Mr. Blondin's petition was not granted.'8 He advocated that the best
472. Id. at 298-99.
473. See Id. at 297 (characterizing the abuse to the children by their father as severe both physically and
emotionally and existing for "an extended period of time").
474. See id. (distinguishing this case, with its clear and convincing evidence of abuse, from Friedrich v.
Friedrich in which no allegation of abuse was made); see also Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6" Cir.
1996) (concluding thatMrs. Friedrichalleges no morethanadjustment problemsthatordinarily attend therelocation
of children).
475. See Blondin 111 78 F. Supp. 2d 283, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding this case also differs from Rydderv.
Rydder, which lacked of specific evidence of harm to the involved children); see also Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d
369.373 (8th Cir. 1995) (denyingMrs. Rydder's claim that separation of the children from theirprimary caretaker
constitutes a grave risk of harm under Article 13(b) of the Convention).
476. 51 Fed. Reg. 10494,10510 (1986).
477. The court characterized the requirement of a finding that the abducted-from country is incapable or
unwilling to give the child adequate protection to be the Sixth Circuit's view, thus suggesting that the requirement
is not binding on this court. See Blondin 111 78 F. Supp. 2d at 297-98; see also Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069 (stating
that a grave risk of harm exist "in cases of serious abuse orneglect. or extraordinary emotional dependence, when
the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable orunwilling to give the child
adequate protection").
478. See Blondin 1, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
479. See d. at 298-99 (addressing the claim that the District Court is interfering with a pending French
custody order).
480. See id,
481. See id. at 299. The hostility sensed by the court from Mr. Chauveau is palpable in the last paragraphs
of this opinion. See id. (reporting that M. Chauveau wondered if the judge viewed the French as "uncivilized
monkeys or responsible partners to an international convention," to which the judge responds in the opinion that
he viewed the French as partners).
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interests of children be the motivation of courts, parents, and the governments of
both France and the United States. 482 The court concluded that the Convention
ultimately provides the judge with the discretion to deny the return of the children
if a grave risk of harm is found and that the court's decision in dismissing Mr.
Blondin's petition is not a matter of "American chauvinism' or distrust of the
French judicial system, but a matter of determining the best interests of the children
within the "framework of the Convention.' 83
F Turner v. Frowein (2000 United States)
Ava Turner, a U.S. citizen, married Onno Frowein, a Dutch citizen, in 1986, and
although the couple lived a substantial part of their marriage apart with dual
residences in New York City and Connecticut, they had a son in 199."4 During the
marriage, Mr. Frowein inflicted physical and emotional abuse on Ms. Turner in
numerous violent episodes.'4 He choked her, tried to push her down stairs, spit in
her face, and verbally abused her, as witnessed by their son and, on occasion, by
neighbors. 48 6 By 1994, Ms. Turner began to consider a divorce, to which
Mr. Frowein retaliated by abducting the son and threatening permanent
separation.0 7 Ms. Turner obtained a restraining order against Mr. Frowein, but
following the return of the child, the couple reconciled on the stipulation that Mr.
Frowein would seek counseling.488 In May 1994, the couple moved to Holland,
where the physical and verbal abuse continued'4
After the couple moved to Holland, Mr. Frowein began to sleep alone with his
son in a separate bedroom.49 On the morning of February 7, 1996, Ms. Turner
discovered her son sleeping naked from the waist down with his father, and
immediately confronted Mr. Frowein with tie accusation of sexual abuse.'49
Ms. Turner moved out that day and in July 1997, secured employment in New York,
intending to take the child with her. However, Mr. Frowein took the child, the
child's passport, and the child's birth certificate, once again threatening never to
return him492 Ms. Turner called the police and told them of the suspected sexual
abuse4 93 The police promised Ms. Turner that a child abuse officer would come to
482. See i.
483. Id.
484. See Tuner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955,961 (Conn. 2000).
485. See Ud
486. See id. at962 n3.
487. See Ud. at 962.
488. See id
489. See &E
490. See id.
491. See id.
492. See id
493. See ia
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her home the next day, but she did not speak to an officer until September and her
son was not returned for ten days.'
On July 28, 1997, Ms. Turner petitioned the Dutch court for a divorce and
permission to relocate to New York with her son4 5 The Dutch court granted
temporary custody to Mr. Frowein without a provision for visitation by
Ms. Turner!96 By September, Mr. Frowein's violence intensified and when Ms.
Turner begged him to let her seethe child, he chocked, kicked, and beat her so badly
that she later have to had a hysterectomy-all in the presence of the child 7 In
October, Ms. Turner withdrew her petition for divorce based on Mr. Frowein's
promise to give her custody and on her attorney's advice that vacating the divorce
action would vacate the temporary custody order granted to Mr. Frowein in
September 9 On that day, October 30, 1997, Ms. Turner took the child with her to
New York.4"
In November, Ms. Turner filed for divorce in New York, and in response,
Mr. Frowein filed a petition for the return of the child under the Hague
Convention. Ms. Turner defended her removal of the child under the "grave risk
of harm" exception, claiming that Mr. Frowein sexually abused his son.!', The court
found the evidence offered by Ms. Turner to prove her allegations of sexual abuse
to be clear and convincing. 2
Ms. Turner's evidence consisted of the following: (1) her own testimony of
finding her son half-naked in bed with Mr. Frowein and of the child's disclosure that
he had "two secrets" that he could not tell because he would "get in trouble";o (2)
a letter from a psychotherapist, who examined the child in the summer of 1996 and
confirmed that Ms. Turner suspected sexual abuse at that time;' (3) the testimony
of John Levanthal, director of Yale University's School of Medicine child sexual
abuse clinic, who physically examined the child twice in 1997 and found evidence
494. See id n.5.
495. Seehl at963.Ms.Tmer sexperiencewiththeDutchcourtwasproblematic.See id She didnotreceive
notice of the hearing date until the night before the hearing, and although she flew to Holland and arrived midway
through the proceeding, it was conducted in Dutch. See i. Speaking limited Dutch and testifying in English, Ms.
7brner apparently missed the opportunity to raise the issue of sexual abuse. See id.
496. See U
497. See Id.
498. See 1d.
499. Seei.
500. See id.
501. See id. at 963-64.
502. See id. at 966.
503. See d. at 964. The mother also noted that when the child returned from a stay with his father, he
appeared anxious, was afraid to disrobe, and confided that he slept every night with his father and that his "daddy
had hurt him." See d.
504. See id. This therapist recommended that the child continue therapy in Holland but apparently Mr.
Fmwein refused to consent. See id Psychotherapy in Holland requires referral from a family physician and the
agreement of both parents. See U n.6.
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of chronic anal injury;5°s (4) the testimony of a clinical social worker and associate
of Leventhal's, who had counseled the child four times finding that the child had
extreme anger toward his father and was preoccupied with hurting his father's
genitals;5°6 (5) the testimony of a court-appointed psychologist who, after examining
the child on several occasions, reported that his assessment was inconclusive as to
whether or not the sexual abuse had occurred;50 (6) the testimony of the elementary
school psychologist, who counseled the child since November 1997, finding that the
child feared his father and that his father would discover his whereabouts; 5°8 and (7)
a former neighbor in Connecticut who reported that the child spontaneously said,
9'Tm going to buy me a big dog to bite my daddy's penis off."509
The trial court found forMs. Turner, granting her temporary custody of her son
and denying Mr. Frowein's petition under the Hague Convention, finding that he
had sexually abused his son.510 Mr. Frowein appealed to the Connecticut Supreme
Court. s1 Although not bound by the Second Circuit's decision in Blondin v.
Dubois,512 the Supreme Court found the decision persuasive and adopted its
analysis.5 13 Following Blondin, the court found that by exploring all possible
remedies that would allow repatriation of the child and yet protect the child's
physical and emotional well-being, thecourt could contemporaneously show respect
for the authority of the tribunal of the habitual residence.5 14 Although affirming the
trial court's conclusion that Ms. Turner had proved by clear and convincing
evidence that Mr. Frowein sexually abused his son,"'5 the court remanded the case
in order to give the lower court an opportunity to evaluate whether the child might
be returned to Holland under the supervision of the parent opposing the return or a
third party, whether remedial measures were needed to guarantee the child's safety,
and whether those measures would be enforceable under Holland's legal system."
505. See i& at 964. Leventhal also testifled that Ms. Turner admitted that she was still wiping her son's anus
which he found "unusual" for a seven-and-a-half year old child. See id
506. See id. at 965. Leventhal found the social workers findings particularly indicative of the father's sexual
abuse. See id. The child reportedly expressed a desire to "kick his father's private part" and to "give him cancer In
his private so they cut it out and he won't hurt anyone anymoreVd.
507. See i Vhleinconclusive regarding sexual abuse, the court-appointedpsychologist noted that the child
was "very afraid" of his father and found the emotion not to have been influenced by Ms. Turner. See d.
508. See ld.
509. Id. at 966.
510. See id. at 955.
511. See id.
512. Blondin IL 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999).
513. See Turner, 752 A.2d 955,971 (Conn. 2000).
514. See id
515. SeeEd. at 966.
516. See id. at 973.
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V. CAN THE GOAL OF COMITY BE RECONCILED WiTH THE
PROTErON OF VICTIMs OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND CHILD ABUSE?
Comity can be reconciled with the protection of victims of domestic violence
and child abuse in Hague Convention cases. Moreover, the reconciliation can be
achieved within the framework of the Hague Convention with little or no
modification. In its decision in Blondin v. Dubois,5 7 the Second Circuit developed
a mechanism within the construct of the Hague Convention that affords protection
for children who are victims of child abuse and domestic violence and yet fosters
comity between the Contracting Countries.
In the past, some judges were reluctant to return children to situations of
domestic violence and child abuse, but felt compelled to order the return of children
in the interest of comity, upon which the Hague Convention is based.51 9 Some courts
suggested that the solution to this conflict lay in the use of "undertakings."520
However, "undertakings" offer nothing more than a superficial remedy because they
are "absolutely unenforceable" by the authorities of the habitual residence.5 1 Under
the Blondin approach, 52 judges and the authorities of the child's habitual residence
can explore together the conditions and circumstances to which the child would
return. The judges can then base their decisions according to these findings.'
Analysis under this approach requires two determinations to be made when
confronted by a claim of "grave risk of harm. '524 First, the court must determine
whether a "grave risk of harm" exists for the child. Second, while exploring all
avenues of possible remedy, the court must decide whether the child can be returned
517. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999).
518. See Turner, 752 A.2d at 972 (advocating the approach taken in Blondin because the approach "respects
the home country's jurisdictional authority without sacrificing the physical and emotional well-being of abducted
children!).
519. SeeMandJ, supra note 162,1026 (discussingtheinstinct offaillycourtjudgestoprotectchildrenand
the balancing of that instinct against the primary responsibility to promptly return the abducted child).
520. See supranotes 190-91 and accompanying text (detailing "undertakings"). MostEuropean Contracting
Countries recognize the use of "undetakings." See Garbolino, supra note 153, at 4.
521. Garbolino, supra note 153, at 4; see also MandJ supra note 162, 031 (declaring that English case
law has established that undertakings should not be used to regulate the affairs of children "beyond the door of the
court of the child's habitual residence").
522. Blondin H1, 189 F.3d at 249-50 (outlining the approach for the District Court to follow on remand).
523. See Blondin MI, 7 F. Supp. 2d 283, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasizing that the courts, the parents and
the governments of both countries should be guided by the best interest of the children); see also M and J, supra
note 162, 049 (approving judicial co-operation and discussing the "real advantages" in securing the best outcome
for children when the judges of different jurisdictions communicate- and collaborate).
524. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's analysis and decision with respect to the first step,
which requires a determination of whethera "grave risk of harm" exists forthe child- therefore, the Second Circuit
opinion predominantly sets out thesecond step. See Blondin H, 189 F.3d240, 248-50 (2d Cir. 1999).The firststep
is analyzed in greater depth by the District Court's initial case. See Blondin 1, 19 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
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to his orher country of habitual residence and still be protected from the "grave risk
of harm.",~
Under the Blondin analysis, the abducting parent must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the child faces a "grave risk of harm" in his or her habitual
residence.: If any modification to the Hague Convention is recommended to
effectuate consistency in the application of this new approach, the Article 13(b)
"grave risk of harm" should be made to explicitly require a high degree of proof
equivalent to the "clear and convincing standard '52 required under the laws of the
United States.5 A high degree of proof, particularly in domestic violence and child
abuse cases, helps to protect against the chance that unfounded allegations of abuse
could be used to acquire a favorable custody decision. Thus, a high burden of proof
deters the use of child abduction as a means of forum shopping yet still protects
children that are clearly victims of child abuse and domestic violence.
Review of the cases selected for discussion in this Comment reveals that
different degrees of proof required to show domestic violence and child abuse can
result in different outcomes. For example, in Wright v. Gueriel,52 the court denied
the return of the children based upon the testimony of three witnesses, revealing
such behavior as yelling and making violent threats, even though the father
presented contrary evidence.3 The Wright case is not explicit in the standard of
proof the court required,5 31 but review of the case supports the assumption that a
"preponderance of evidence standard ' 32 was used. More aliined with the Hague
Convention and using a "clear and convincing standard" as mandated by the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act,533 the Nunez-Escudero court u found
the husband's failure to secure an infant seat, an incident of violent behavior by the
wife's father-in-law, and the objection by the family to the wife nursing her baby
were insufficient to establish a "grave risk of harm" exception 35
525. Blondin ]I, 189 F.3d at 245, 249.
526. See id. at 245.
527. "Clearand convincing proof"is demonstrated by evidence that allows a reasonable certainty ofthe trth
of the matter in question. BLACK'S LAW DIC'oNARY 172 (6th abr. ed. 1991).
528. See Elliott, supra note 249, at2l; see also 42 U. S. C. § 11603(e)(2)(A) (West 1999) (requiring clear
and convincing evidence of an Article 13(b) exception).
529. Wright, supra note 25; see also supra notes 328-44 (expounding on the facts of Wright).
530. See I. However, this decision may bejustified by the fact that regardless wich jurisdiction makes a
decision, the decision is always subject to the "good sense" or bias of thejudge. See Levy, supra note 297, at 185.
Furthermore, thejudge, as a fact-finder, has the ability to evaluate the demeanor ofthe witness, an important aspect
in determining credibility of testimony by an eyewitness. In reA and Another, supra note 203, 1034.
531. Wright, supra note 25.
532. "Preponderance of evidence" is the standard whereby the evidence offered is of greater weight or more
convincing than the evidence offered by the opposition. See BLACK'S LAW DIcONARY 819 (6th abr. ed. 1991).
533. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A).
534. 58 F.3d 374, 375 (8* Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the facts of the Nunez-Escudero. see supra notes
361-374 and accompanying.
535. See id at 375.
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The outcome in the Murray case536 is troubling because it seems to disregard the
evidence of domestic violence, including photographs of the defending wife
following one particularly long and brutal beating.537 The complex and patterned
nature of domestic violence is becoming more broadly understood.5 38 The
accumulative and permanent effects on children who merely witness domestic
violence are more clearly known s39 Moreover, studies show that little deterrence
results from batterer treatment and criminal or civil legal sanctionsYs This growing
understanding of domestic violence is hard to reconcile with the Murray court's
statement that "it would be presumptuous and offensive in the extreme, for a court
of [Australia] to conclude that the wife and the children are not capable of being
protected by the New Zealand Courts"' Criticism for the Murray decision centers,
not on the return of the children to New Zealand, but on the court's blind
assumption that the children were not in any direct danger and that the mother could
be protected upon her return s42 The Murray court neither explored the allegations
of the "grave risk of harm" to the children if returned, or the protection that the
children would receive upon their return. With what is currently known about
domestic violence, to assume that any mechanism other than distance can interrupt
the cycle of violence is unrealistic.
Despite some disconcerting findings, like that in Murray, as international
jurisprudence in Hague Convention cases continues to develop, abalancing between
the goals of promptly returning children to their habitual residences and protecting
children from grave risks of harm is evolving. Courts are developing creative means
of dealing with domestic violence and child abuse within the context of the Hague
Convention, perhaps due to the increased confrontation of such cases& 3 Courts
developed "undertakings" as a means of returning a child to his or her habitual
residence, though not necessarily to the custody of the petitioner.5" In contrast, the
Blondin approach offers greater protection to children by requiring the courts to
536. See Murray, supra note 188. For a discussion ofMurray, see supra notes 345-360 and accompanying
text.
537. See Murray, supra note 188, at 4.
538. See CRiMNAuZATioN OFDoMESTc VtoLENcE, supra note 44, at 18 (distinguishing domestic violence
from other forms of violence due to the strong emotional ties between the victim and the abuser, and the
involvement of financial dependency and a desire to protect the children). This source presents a 30 year study of
domestic violence and characterize domestic violence as a recurring and often daily event that occurs outside of
public observation. See generally k
539. See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text (discussing domestic violence and child abuse).
540. See CRTmnwAnoN oF Do mic VIOLENCF, supra note 44, at 1 (describing the research and
evaluation of prosecution of batterers, protective orders, and batterer treatment as largely ineffective).
541. Murray, supra note 188, at 19.
542. See U!
543. The Blondin, Rodriguez, and 7krner cases are examples of cases involving compelling evidence of
domestic violence, and child abuse. See supra notes 414-483 and accompanying text (discussing the Blondn); see
also supra notes 375.413 and accompanying text (outlining the facts of the Rodriguez); supra notes 484-516 and
accompanying text (reviewing the Turner).
544. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (detailing "undertakings").
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explore the specifics of possible remedies, rather than merely extracting promises
that prove to be unenforceable once the child is returned. This exploration involves
the governments of both parties, as well as the parties themselves.5 It requires the
consideration of the full range of remedies that allows the child to both be returned
to his or her habitual residence and provides the child with protection from harm. 6
The remedies include temporary placement with a third party and sufficient
assurance of the child's protection and the mother's protection if she also retums.M7
The Blondin approach to cases of "grave risk of harm" may provide a long range
effect on reducing the incidence of domestic violence. Since children exposed to
domestic violence have an increased likelihood of becoming abusers themselves,
anything that deters domestic violence has the natural potential to decrease its
incidence.m8 Domestic violence studies that involve the empowerment of victims
also show promise of deterrent effects. 9 When government authorities fail to
protect the victims of domestic violence, that failure has a demoralizing effect on the
victims and a perpetuating effect on the abuser.5 ° Finally, the refusal to return the
victim to his or her abuser as a result of clear and convincing evidence of domestic
violence and child abuse, encourages victims to report such abuse. Police reports
and other mechanisms whereby persons outside of the home can have knowledge
of the abuse aids in establishing clear and convincing evidence of the abuse to later
support a "grave risk of harm" defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The deterrence of international child abduction, domestic violence, and child
abuse are of equal-importance. The jurisdictional provision of the Hague
Convention that mandates the return of an abducted child to the jurisdiction of his
or her habitual residence is an effective tool in deterring international child
abduction.551 However, given that one in three women worldwide are, or will be, a
victim of violence,552 that up to sixty percent of men who abuse their partners also
545, See Blondin 1I, 189 F3d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) (instructing the District Court to explore alternate
placement, exercise broad equitable discretion in developing a record to support its decision, and to consult freely
with the French government and the Department of State).
546. See id.
547. See Ia
548. See IMAroF DoMEsicVoLtcE supra note 21, at I (noting that violence in the family increases
the likelihood that children who are a product of that environment will also exhibit violent behavior when they
become adults).
549. See CRimmAuTmoN oFDomE cVto.sN c., supra note 44, at 11.
550. Seegenerally id. Note that in most of the select case law presented in this Comment, prior to abducting
the child, the victim sought the assistance of a governmental authority to no avail. See supra note 333 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 400 and accompanying text; see also Blondin 1, 189 F.3d at 243; see also
supra notes 493-94 and accompanying text.
551. See supra note53 and accompanyingtext(reportinganincreasein theretumofabducted hildren to the
United States with the Hague Treaty in force).
552. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
448
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 13
abuse their childrens553 and that approximately twenty percent of parents who abduct
their children do so to escape domestic violence, domestic violence and child
abuse are bound to significantly impact international child abduction. Select
international case law discussed in this Comment vividly reveals the reality of
domestic violence and child abuse, andits impact on international child abduction 55
To narrow the interpretation of the provisions of the Hague Convention to a simple
determination ofjurisdiction, regardless of the circumstances, ignores this reality. 5 6
Under such a narrow construction without regard for the circumstances under which
victims of domestic violence and child abuse flee their abusers across international
borders, the Hague Convention governs their re-victimization.5 7
Domestic violence and child abuse, if proven to exist, present a "grave risk of
harm" to a child, both physically and psychologicallys8 Fortunately, the drafters of
the Convention had the foresight to adopt the "grave risk of harm" exception, which
grants the courts of the country to which the child is abducted the discretion to deny
the return of the child if a "grave risk of harm" is found to exists.559 Because
evidence of domestic violence and child abuse often overlaps with factors
considered by the jurisdiction of the child's habitual residence in making custody
determinations, "m the denial of the return of the child in instances of domestic
violence and child abuse may place the comity shared by the two countries at risk.5 61
The new approach set forth in Blondin requires a court in a Hague Convention
action to make the following two determinations: (1) whether a "grave risk of harm"
exists for the child in his or her habitual residence and (2) whether any remedies
exist by which the child can be returned to his or her habitual residence and still be
protected from the "grave risk of harm.' 2 Using this approach, comity is enhanced
by encouraging communication between the court and the governments of the
CQntracting Countries in the pursuance of the child's protection. Of equal
importance is the realistic and planned protection of the child from domestic
violence and abuse-from a "grave risk of harm"
553. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
554. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
555. See supra notes 321-516 (providing a review of six cases of international child abduction that cases
involve domestic violence and child abuse).
556. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
557. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (describing some of the effects suffered by children as
a result of domestic violence).
559. See supra notes 164-201 (discussing the "grave risk of harm" exception).
560. See, e-g., Blondin 11 78 F. Supp. 2d 283,289 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (reporting that France communicated
concern that the U.S. court was interfering with the jurisdiction of a French custody dispute).
561. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of reciprocity among Contracting
States).
562. See 189 F.3d 240,240 (2d Cir. 1999).

